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3 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1999).
4 MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
5 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For reasons I have explained elsewhere, I prefer the
phrase “race-conscious decision-making” to describe the conduct addressed by both the Equal
Protection Clause and the anti-preference laws, as opposed to more commonly used locutions
like “affirmative action” or “reverse discrimination,” at least when I am writing in an academic
vein. See Michael E. Rosman, Thoughts On Bakke and Its Effect on Race-Conscious Decision-
Making, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 45 n.1.
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CHALLENGES TO STATE ANTI-PREFERENCE LAWS AND THE
ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS
Michael E. Rosman*
On November 5, 1996, the people of California passed Proposition 209 in an
initiative election, which subsequently led to the addition of article 1, section 31 to
the California Constitution.1  That provision prohibited various state actors from
“discriminat[ing] against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting.”2  In 1998, the people
of the State of Washington passed a similar provision, known as I-200, in a similar
referendum, which led to a new section being added to that state’s statute books.3  In
2006, the people of the State of Michigan passed another similar provision, Proposal 2,
which led to the addition of article 1, section 26 to the Michigan Constitution.4  Finally,
the Nebraska polity passed Initiative 424 in 2008, which added article 1, section 30 to
the Nebraska Constitution.5
Each of these popularly enacted provisions, which for ease of reference I will
refer to as anti-preference laws, were deemed to prohibit race-conscious decision-
making by the state that might be permitted under federal law, including the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.6
That is not the feature that this Article focuses on, however.  Rather, it focuses on the
fact that these laws generally can be enforced in state court by private individuals
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7 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369–70 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
8 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
9 See infra Part V.B.
in civil lawsuits seeking damages and other kinds of relief.  As a consequence, when
these provisions have been challenged in federal court as a violation of federal law
in a pre-enforcement challenge, there is an obvious problem.  Precisely who should
be sued?  That there is no obvious answer to this question—and that the absence of an
obvious answer creates difficult jurisdictional problems—is the issue that this Article
addresses.  The questions about jurisdiction all revolve around the same basic fact:
these laws are not, by and large, enforced by the executive branch of state government
and even when they are, the primary tool of enforcement is still lawsuits brought by
private individuals in which state judges enforce the law.  And there is not a great
deal that a lower federal court can do to restrain the behavior of unknown private
individuals and state court judges.
Of course, the anti-preference laws are not the only privately enforceable laws out
there. Many standards of behavior are set by “privately-enforced” laws, i.e., laws that
can be enforced in a lawsuit brought by a private citizen.  Defamation lawsuits under
state common law7 and lawsuits alleging misstatements in violation of section 11 of
the Securities Act of 19338 are just two of many examples one could list.  The same
jurisdictional problems would arise were the constitutionality of these laws challenged
in a pre-enforcement proceeding.  As a general rule, they are not challenged in pre-
enforcement proceedings, but rather by defendants sued for damages.9
Part I of this Article sets forth the relevant provisions of the anti-preference laws
and the usual arguments that are used to claim that such laws violate federal law.  I do
not assess those arguments in any great detail.  (That is, whether those arguments
would be successful if asserted by defendants in a case alleging that they violated an
anti-preference law is not something addressed at length here.)  In Part II, I review
more carefully the enforcement provisions of the anti-preference laws, and consider
the problems with the two injunctions that have been issued so far by federal judges
in cases challenging anti-preference laws.  In Part III, I address the basic jurisdictional
doctrines that present obstacles to challenges to privately enforceable laws being heard
in federal court.
In Part IV, I consider the application of these jurisdictional doctrines to the anti-
preference laws, examine various possible defendants that can be sued in federal court,
and explore the problems that each presents given the jurisdictional doctrines at issue.
Finally, in Part V, after considering whether Congress possibly could fix some of the
problems by eliminating states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, I suggest that test-
ing the limits that federal law imposes on privately enforceable laws through actual
cases, while perhaps not the most efficient means of developing those limits, has some
distinct advantages and, in any event, is hardly something new to our jurisprudence.
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10 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26(2); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30;
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400(1) (1999). In what might be deemed a bit of redundancy,
section 1 of Michigan’s constitutional provision specifically states that “[t]he University of
Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college
or university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to . . . .” MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26(1). Arguably, the named universities
are subject to the prohibition even if some parts of them are not deemed “public” universities.
Otherwise, it is difficult to understand what purpose the separate provision serves, especially
given the broad scope given to “state” in the Michigan law. Id. at art. 1, § 26(3).
11 See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (“The parties do not dispute . . . that the people of California meant to do something
more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209.”), vacated on
other grounds, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997); Hi-Voltage Wire
Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1082–83 (Cal. 2000) (reviewing the purpose
of Proposition 209 and concluding that the voters of California intended to reinstate early
interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that precluded considerations of race).
12 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
13 Thus, for example, the Washington Supreme Court, answering a certified question from
the Ninth Circuit, concluded that Seattle’s system of high school transfers, in which members
of the racial groups “whites” and “non-whites” were given advantages in the transfer process
if their racial group was underrepresented at a particular school, did not violate Washington’s
anti-preference law. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151,
163–67 (Wash. 2003) (concluding that the program does not discriminate or grant preferences
to any individual based upon race). The United States Supreme Court held that the program
I.
The primary substantive provision of each of the anti-preference laws in California,
Washington, Michigan, and Nebraska is the same.  Each has a provision stating: “The
state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation
of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”10
The purpose of these anti-preference laws is generally understood to be an effort
to prohibit race-conscious and sex-conscious decision-making by state actors that is
permitted under federal law, most prominently the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.11  The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the use
of race-conscious decision-making by a state if the use of race is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest.  For example, the Supreme Court has held
that achieving a certain kind of diversity of a college student body is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and that the use of race in a narrowly tailored way to achieve that
compelling governmental interest is not barred by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or other federal law.12  The anti-preference laws are designed
to preclude that kind of race-conscious decision-making.  Of course, whether the anti-
preference laws achieve that goal will only be determined as they are interpreted by
state courts.13
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violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). A point of this Article is that state courts,
and their interpretations of both state and federal law, are important. Certainly, these cases
underscore that point.
14 See, e.g., Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 247 (6th
Cir. 2006) (granting motion to stay stipulated injunction suspending application of Michigan
Constitution article 1, section 26 pending appeal, and concluding that the arguments proffered
by those supporting the stipulated injunction “[did] not offer tenable explanations for suspend-
ing Proposal 2 on the basis of federal law”); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d
692 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting challenge to article 1, section 31 of the California Constitution);
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (rejecting challenge to article 1, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution);
Coral Constr., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 781 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (rejecting challenge to article 1, section 31 of the California Constitution), review
granted, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 761 (2007).
15 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
16 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
17 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
18 Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 463.
19 Id. at 470 (holding that the initiative “allocate[d] governmental power nonneutrally,
by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process”);
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389 (holding that the charter amendment was “an explicitly racial classi-
fication treating racial housing matters differently from other racial and housing matters”).
20 Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 487; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392–93.
21 For example, the Court in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 “note[d] that the State
has not attempted to reserve to itself exclusive power to deal with racial issues generally.”
458 U.S. at 479 n.22. Arguably, state anti-preference laws are efforts to do just that over a broad
A variety of arguments have been used to challenge the anti-preference laws as
violative of federal law.  None have been successful to date.14  For purposes of this
Article, I address only the following arguments:
1. The Structural Discrimination Argument.  In Hunter v. Erickson15 and
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,16 the Supreme Court considered the
propriety of having special procedural requirements for certain kinds of laws that
addressed racial issues.  In Hunter, it was an amendment to the Akron City Charter
that repealed a fair housing ordinance and made all such fair housing ordinances
passed by the city council in the future subject to approval by a majority of the electors
voting at a regular or general election.17  In Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
it was a state-wide initiative in Washington that made illegal the use of mandatory bus-
ing and other enumerated techniques for purposes of racial integration of the public
schools.18  In each instance the Court found the law unconstitutional because it placed
greater burdens on laws that were of particular interest to minorities.19  Those features
rendered each law violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.20
The rulings in Hunter v. Erickson and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1
are not without their ambiguities, nor is the “structural discrimination” argument’s
application to anti-preference laws without doubt.21  But, the argument goes, those
2010] CHALLENGES TO STATE ANTI-PREFERENCE LAWS 713
range of issues. At the very least, they have a broader scope than the laws at issue in Hunter
(dealing only with housing) and Washington v. Seattle (only with public school assignments).
22 See, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in which
Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 480–82 (1999).
23 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1499–1509 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that Hunter and Seattle stand for the proposition that if legislation has a “racial
focus” and restructures the political process for those seeking favorable legislation on that issue,
then it must be treated as if it were a racial classification, and concluding that Proposition 209
was unconstitutional as a consequence), vacated on other grounds, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 712
(9th Cir. 1997) (Norris, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 717 (Hawkins, J.,
commenting on the denial of rehearing en banc); Coral Constr., Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 781, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (Rivera, J., concurring and dissenting).
24 Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1513–17.
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
26 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
27 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (2009) (“Voluntary affirmative action to improve
opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected in order to carry
out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII.”).
28 Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1516.
29 In addition, section 708 of Title VII states that Title VII should not be deemed “to exempt
or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present
or future law of any State . . . other than any such law which purports to require or permit the
doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.”
cases establish the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause is violated if a law
(1) addresses a “racial” issue, and (2) restructures normal government decision-making
so as to create a different (and more burdensome) process for the racial issue than for
other issues in the same general area.22  Anti-preference laws arguably meet both con-
ditions: they are designed to limit race-conscious decision-making, and they place a
difficult obstacle in the path of those who favor such race-conscious decision-making.
Although this analysis has not yet succeeded past the trial court level, it has been
adopted by a number of judges.23
2. Title VII Preemption.  Insofar as anti-preference laws restrict the use of race-
conscious decision-making by employers, an argument has been made (and accepted
by one district court)24 that it is preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196425 and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.26  The argument
is that Title VII does not merely permit race-conscious decision-making, but encour-
ages it.  EEOC guidelines interpreting Title VII are used to support this theory.27  If
Congress intended to give employers the option of using race-conscious decision-
making, the argument is that an anti-preference law that interferes with that option at
the “employer level” undermines the purpose of Title VII.28
Again, the argument is not without potential pitfalls, and, perhaps most obvi-
ously, it only relates to one of the three areas (public employment) in which the anti-
preference laws operate.29  Nonetheless, it may be a plausible argument, at least for
that one area.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006). This arguably precludes any reliance on “conflict preemption”
(i.e., preemption because a state law conflicts with the purpose of Title VII). See Wilson, 122
F.3d at 710.
30 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
31 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
32 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
33 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44.
34 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 247 (6th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting the argument because “[t]he [u]niversities mistake interests grounded in the First
Amendment . . . with First Amendment rights”).
35 Cf. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[A]ny State . . . is
generally free, as far as the Constitution is concerned, to abjure granting any racial preferences
in its admissions program.”).
3. First Amendment.  It is sometimes argued that colleges and universities have
a First Amendment right to consider race and ethnicity as one of many factors, and as
part of their efforts to assemble a class that is broadly diverse.  This argument derives
from the Supreme Court opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,30 and Justice Powell’s opinion
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.31  Each of those opinions stated
that a university’s interest in academic freedom, grounded in the First Amendment,
constituted a compelling governmental interest that permitted such institutions of
higher education to consider race, in a limited way, as one of many factors in the
admissions process, without violating the Equal Protection Clause or other federal
law.32  Grutter specifically upheld a law school admissions process on that ground.33
Thus, the argument goes, anti-preference laws violate the First Amendment by
restricting a college or university’s academic freedom right, grounded in the First
Amendment, to use race in a limited way while selecting the members of its student
body.  It has not yet been accepted by any judge, at least as far as I am aware.34  And,
of course, its applicability outside of the higher education context is even more
questionable.  Nonetheless, I include it here because it is not an entirely implausible
extension of existing Supreme Court precedent.
***
These are not the only arguments that have been used to challenge anti-preference
laws, but they are the most viable, in my view.  Other arguments suggest that the use
of race is not merely permissible and authorized by federal law, but required by fed-
eral law, or that the anti-preference law was born out of an animus against members
of particular races who were receiving benefits.  I leave these arguments to the side
in this Article.  Whatever their merit in a particular context, I seriously doubt that any
court will hold that states are always required to use race-conscious decision-making,
and it is the broad (i.e., facial) attacks on the anti-preference laws that I would like to
focus upon.35  Similarly, an attack on the motive under which an anti-preference law
has been adopted seems unlikely to be successful while they are being adopted
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36 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
37 Id.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
40 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586–89.
41 Id. at 587. Compare id. (“Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that no law prohibited
Louisiana public school teachers from teaching any scientific theory.”), with id. at 599 (Powell,
J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘academic freedom’ of teachers to present information in public schools,
and students to receive it, . . . necessarily is circumscribed by the Establishment Clause.”).
42 Id. at 587 (majority opinion).
through plebiscites.  In any event, such an argument would, of necessity, focus on
the motives of the electorate in a particular election, and unlike the arguments I have
outlined above, might not be of much use when the next election, in a different state,
came along.
So, the arguments I am focusing upon do not suggest that any state official is re-
quired to engage in race-conscious decision-making.  It is not, then, the underlying con-
duct of race neutrality that is being attacked, but a law that requires that race neutrality.
To put it another way, the conduct itself may be permissible, but the law requiring
it is not precisely because it limits the freedom of the regulated person/entity.  One con-
sequence of this is that a judge cannot simply enjoin the regulated person/entity from
engaging in the conduct (race neutrality) in question.  An analogy may be helpful.
In Edwards v. Aguillard,36 the Court considered a Louisiana statute that required
the teaching of “creation science” if evolution was taught.37  The Court held that the
statute was facially invalid and violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment,38 as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.39  Specifically, the Court
rejected the state’s identified purpose of “academic freedom” to support the law, and
found that it had no secular purpose at all.40  But the Court did not hold that teaching
“creation science” violated the U.S. Constitution.  To the contrary, it held that the
purported purpose of “academic freedom” was not advanced by the statute because
the statute “does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not already possess to
supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of theories, besides
evolution, about the origin of life.”41  It was not teaching “creation science” that was
at issue in Edwards v. Aguillard, but rather a law that limited teachers’ decisions to
teach it or not.42
The common thread in Edwards and the argument against anti-preference laws
that I wish to focus on, then, is that the challenge is not to the underlying conduct of
a state actor, but to a law that allegedly limits the underlying conduct of a state actor.
II.
After a brief look at the remedial schemes built into the anti-preference laws, we
will look at two injunctions actually issued against the enforcement of such laws to
illustrate the difficulties in formulating a proper injunction.
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43 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(g); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26(6); NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 30(7);
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400(8) (1999). The ellipsis in the quoted text is replaced, in each
of California, Michigan and Washington’s laws, by the name of the state or, in the case of
Michigan and Washington, the name used in the possessive. California’s provision includes
the hyphenated word “then-existing,” which is absent from the other state statutes. See, e.g.,
Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1335, 1390 (1997) (“[T]he reference to ‘then-existing California antidiscrimination law’
makes clear that the remedial scheme isn’t frozen at November 1996, but should be borrowed
from whatever framework is generally in effect at the time the claim takes place.”).
44 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2101 (West 2001) (“This act shall be known and may
be cited as the ‘Elliot-Larsen civil rights act.’”).
45 Id. at § 37.2102(1).
46 Id. at § 37.2801(1).
47 Id. at §§ 37.2601–.2606.
48 Section 37.2602(c) states that “[t]he department shall . . . [r]eceive, initiate, investigate,
conciliate, adjust, dispose of, issue charges, and hold hearings on complaints alleging a
A. The Remedial Schemes
Each of the anti-preference laws that have been enacted in California, Washington,
Michigan, and Nebraska has a similar provision about remedies: “The remedies avail-
able for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless of the injured party’s
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise available for violations
of . . . anti-discrimination law.”43
The remedy provisions, then, give “injured parties” (at least) the right to seek
remedies, and those remedies are the same as those for other anti-discrimination laws.
Several questions arise.  First, is the authority of a state official to sue for a violation
of the other anti-discrimination law a “remedy” or just a means of enforcement?  If it
is only the latter, a state official’s right to sue for a violation of the state’s general anti-
discrimination law may not be enough to grant the state official authority to sue for
a violation of the anti-preference law.  Second, who grants remedies to the injured
parties?  Again, the answer must lie in the other state laws to which the remedy pro-
visions refer.  Each state’s law will differ, of course, but a few examples will provide
a general pattern.
The general anti-discrimination provision in Michigan is known as the Elliott-
Larsen Civil Rights Act.44  It is a broad, sweeping law that covers opportunities with
respect to employment, housing, public accommodations, public service, and edu-
cational facilities and prohibits discrimination on the basis of “religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status.”45  Section
801 of the Act provides that a person alleging a violation may bring “a civil action
for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both.”46  At the same time, article 6
of the Act47 provides some process for the Michigan Department of Civil Rights to
consider complaints filed with it, and for the Michigan Civil Rights Commission to
hold hearings concerning the complaint.48  The Attorney General of the State of
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violation of this act . . . .” Id. at § 37.2602(c). Section 37.2604, somewhat more cryptically,
states that the Commission, “after a hearing on a charge issued by the department,” shall do
various things depending upon its findings. Id. at § 37. 2604. Curiously, Section 601 of the
Elliott-Larsen Act, which lists the Commission’s general powers and duties, states that “[t]he
commission may hold hearings, but does not identify the subject matter of the hearings. Id. at
§ 37.2601(2). The Commission is a body established by the Michigan Constitution. MICH.
CONST. art. V, § 29.
49 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2602(b). There appear to be only two instances in which
either the Department or the Commission would appear in state court in a matter related to the
enforcement of the Elliott-Larsen Act section  37.2603 gives the Department authority to file
a petition seeking appropriate temporary relief pending final determination of a case before
the Commission. Id. at § 37.2603. Section  37.2606(2) permits the Commission to file a petition
for “enforcement of an appealable order” in court. Id. at § 37.2606(2); see Walker v. Wolverine
Fabricating & Mfg. Co., 360 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he [Commission]
may go to court on behalf of an aggrieved party to enforce its decision . . . .”), rev’d in part,
391 N.W.2d 296 (Mich. 1986).
In contrast to the Michigan Attorney General’s role as a lawyer for other executive branch
(or independent) agencies under the Elliott-Larsen Act, other provisions of the Michigan code
give the Attorney General direct authority to sue. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.271
(authority to sue for violations by public bodies of the Open Meetings Act); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.§ 500.230 (authority to sue for penalties under the Insurance Code of 1956).
50 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–12996 (2005).
51 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (2007); see also id. at § 51.5(a).
52 See Volokh, supra note 43, at 1336 n.2, 1389 (The author, a “legal advisor to the pro-
CCRI campaign” who “participated in the late stages of the initiative’s drafting,” asserts that
“[c]ourts should borrow the remedies from the most similar area of the law—for instance,
borrow from employment discrimination law in employment cases and from educational
discrimination law in education cases.”).
53 CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(c).
Michigan is tasked by statute with representing the Commission or Department in
court.49
California presents a slightly more complicated situation, because there is more
than one law that conceivably could be deemed an “anti-discrimination” law.  The Fair
Employment and Housing Act covers employment discrimination.50  Other kinds of
discrimination by businesses generally come under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.51
The remedial provisions of the latter Act presumably would cover discrimination in
“public contracting” and “public education” that violated California’s anti-preference
law.  The use of different statutes for different kinds of violations of California’s anti-
preference law was apparently intended by those who drafted the initiative.52
While FEHA has a fairly comprehensive remedial scheme, not unlike the Elliott-
Larsen Act, the Unruh Act and other likely applicable provisions have a fairly simple
and straightforward remedial provision.  Section 52(c) of California’s Civil Code pro-
vides that a “person aggrieved,” the Attorney General, or any district or city attorney
may bring a civil action against a person or group engaged in “conduct of resistance
to the full enjoyment of any of the rights described in this section.”53
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54 Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1520–21 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
vacated on other grounds, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997); cf.
This obviously is not intended to be a comprehensive examination of the enforce-
ment provisions in any state’s anti-preference law.  The only point that deserves em-
phasis is that individual enforcement schemes vary, and that, in almost all instances,
the remedial schemes include a private individual’s right to sue a transgressor.
B. Efforts to Enjoin the Operation of Anti-Preference Laws
A brief look at the injunctions actually issued in two cases challenging anti-
preference laws illustrates the problems in formulating an effective one.  In the
challenge to California’s anti-preference law, the district court issued a preliminary
injunction against the Governor, Attorney General, and all members of the class they
represented (basically, all state officials subject to the law) that
restrained and enjoined, pending trial or final judgment in this
action, from implementing or enforcing Proposition 209 insofar
as said amendment . . . purports to prohibit or affect affirmative
action programs in public employment, public education, or
public contracting.
The aforesaid preliminary injunction shall not preclude the following:
1. all defendants, including members of the defendant class, from
identifying, reviewing and analyzing existing affirmative action
programs. (FN 53)
(FN 53) The preliminary injunction does not, of course, interfere
with the ability of any defendant . . . to voluntarily adopt, retain,
amend or repeal an affirmative action program.  It does preclude
any defendant or member of the defendant class from taking any
action with respect to an affirmative action program in order to
enforce, implement, or otherwise comply with, Proposition 209.
. . .
3. proceedings in pending state court actions related to Article 1,
section 31, including [action by the Governor to enforce it], and
4. the California Attorney General from defending Article 1,
section 31 in any legal proceeding challenging its validity under
the United States Constitution.54
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Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C96-4024, 1996 WL 788375, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1996) (issuing temporary restraining order that “RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED [the
Regents of the University of California] from implementing or enforcing Proposition 209
insofar as said amendment . . . purports to prohibit or affect affirmative action programs in
public employment, public education or public contracting,” while noting earlier that the
“University is free to implement [resolutions aimed at eliminating the use of race, ethnicity,
or gender in hiring, contracting, and admissions], regardless of the outcome of this case”).
55 Wilson, 1996 WL 788375, at *1, *3.
56 Id. at *3.
57 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1) (“Every order granting an injunction and every restraining
order must: . . . (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail . . . the
act or acts restrained or required.”).
58 Evidence for discrimination by an employer can be developed statistically, if numbers
are large enough, or by implication (through comparisons of the qualifications of candidates
of different races). Analogous evidentiary options for determining the motivation of a state
agency’s actions are not immediately obvious.
59 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, No. 06-15024, 2006 WL 3953321,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2006), stay granted by 473 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied
sub nom. Mich. Civ. Rights Initiative Comm. v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 129
S. Ct. 35 (2008).
60 Id. As Judge Learned Hand once famously wrote, a court “cannot lawfully enjoin the
world at large, no matter how broadly it words its decree.” Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42
F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“[A]n injunction prohibiting the world from filing private suits would be a flagrant violation
So the injunction by Judge Henderson permitted state agencies to voluntarily
repeal any affirmative action program, but precluded them from implementing or
complying with California’s anti-preference law.55  The injunction provides little
guidance between the permissible voluntary repealing of programs of race-conscious
decision-making and the impermissible “implementation” of the anti-preference law.56
The difficulties one might have in enforcing the injunction strike me as significant.
If a state executive “voluntarily” repealed a program of race-conscious decision-
making in part because he or she believed it reflected the general will of the people
of California, albeit without considering that will as binding, would it have violated
the injunction?57  Perhaps the difficulties are not sufficient to withhold relief—one
imagines that an injunction precluding an employer from discriminating on the basis
of race in hiring might present similar difficulties—but they do cast doubt on how
effective such an injunction would be.58
Consider, too, the stipulated injunction issued in the challenge to the Michigan
anti-preference law: “[I]t is ordered that the application of Article 1, section 26 of the
Michigan Constitution of 1963 to the current admissions and financial aid policies
of [defendant Universities] is enjoined from this date through the end of the current
admissions and financial aid cycles . . . .”59
The first and most obvious problem with the injunction is that it does not state
who is enjoined; it just passively states that “the application” of the law “is enjoined.”60
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of both Article III and the due process clause (for putative private plaintiffs are entitled to
be notified and heard before courts adjudicate their entitlements).”).
61 Granholm, 2006 WL 3953321, at *1.
62 See, e.g., Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2001) (where court ordered
detention, officers who used excessive force were not immune from liability), cert. denied
sub nom. Burgeson v. Richman, 535 U.S. 971 (2002). Indeed, the universities themselves later
denied that they were capable of enforcing the law. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
63 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
64 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (explaining that entities only have
sovereign immunity as distinguished from “personal-capacity” immunity); VanHorn v.
Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that quasi-judicial immunity is not
available for defendants sued in their official capacities).
65 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
66 Id. at 626–27.
67 Id. at 628–29.
68 Id. at 657–58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 647–48 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 653 (Stevens, J., concurring). The majority (including Justice Stevens) did not
resolve the question of immunity, concluding that it would not be decided until the Secretary
of State, enjoined from enforcing the statute in question by the preliminary injunction, com-
menced an action under the state law. Id. at 630.
At that stage of the litigation, only the Governor, the Attorney General (by inter-
vention), and the universities whose policies were affected by this injunction were
defendants in the case—and they all had stipulated to it.61
Plainly, a state court judge might not be deterred from enforcing the anti-preference
law by such a stipulated injunction.  Would the universities who were parties have had
a defense against a lawsuit that sought damages for any conduct while the injunction
was in effect?  It is unclear, but I doubt it.  The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity may
protect those who take acts required by an injunction, but nothing in the injunction
required the universities to take race-conscious measures.62  (Indeed, the same would
hold true of the more detailed injunction issued by Judge Henderson against imple-
mentation of the California anti-preference law.)63  In any event, the doctrine of quasi-
judicial immunity applies to individuals sued in their individual capacities for dam-
ages; it would not apply to individuals sued in their official capacities, and might not
apply to entities amenable to suit.64
Nor is it clear that federal courts can grant any other kind of immunity through
their injunctions.  Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall addressed this question in
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,65 a case involving the legality of an Illinois regulation of cor-
porate takeovers.66  A preliminary injunction had been issued enjoining the Illinois
Secretary of State from enforcing the statute while the case was pending.67  While
Justice Marshall thought that a federal court injunction against enforcement of a law
should preclude later bringing suit against a party who relied on that injunction to
engage in conduct violative of the law,68 Justice Stevens disagreed.69  “There simply
is no constitutional or statutory authority that permits a federal judge to grant dispen-
sation from a valid state law.”70  That is, there is a difference between enjoining parties
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71 Thus, for example, if substantially identical state and federal laws both prohibited
the same conduct, an injunction against a state prosecutor, on the grounds that the law vio-
lated one of the Bill of Rights, would seem unlikely to preclude a federal prosecutor from
acting under the federal law. Cf. David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory
Judgments, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 759, 762 (1979) (injunction against state prosecutor may not
be effective if “the federal plaintiffs . . . have moved to another county where even the local
prosecutor may not be subject to contempt”). But see Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal
Courts, Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to
Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 444–45 (arguing that federal courts
will uphold injunctions against state officials even if they are not specifically named parties).
72 Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1971) (“The kind of relief granted in
Dombrowski thus does not effectively eliminate uncertainty as to the coverage of the state
statute and leaves most citizens with virtually the same doubts as before regarding the danger
that their conduct might eventually be subjected to criminal sanctions.”); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7 (1965) (explaining the Court’s precedent holding that once a
limiting construction of an overbroad statute has been obtained, that statute can be applied
to conduct occurring prior to the adoption of the limiting construction).
73 Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under The Fair Housing Act, 60 MO.
L. REV. 547, 550 (1995); see also id. at 550 nn.13–15. The academic skepticism of the con-
stitutional standing cases does not seem to have diminished much since. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 613, 639 (1999) (arguing that, aside from being unmoored in the text or history of
the Constitution, the “injury in fact” test “is not even coherent”).
from taking certain actions and simply granting others immunity for any actions they
may take.71  An injunction that simply permits a university or municipality to engage
in race-conscious decision-making that would otherwise violate a state anti-preference
law, or even that precludes them from weighing the anti-preference law in determining
whether to engage in such conduct, may not actually affect the university’s or munici-
pality’s behavior because it might not preclude any subsequent state court lawsuits
against it.72
III.
The two related jurisdictional problems that I explore in this section are
(1) Article III standing and (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity.  In the end, each
doctrine revolves around the same fundamental problems: the specific state official
sued in a pre-enforcement proceeding may not have much authority to enforce the
law and no judgment will preclude state judges from enforcing an anti-preference
law in a lawsuit commenced by a private citizen.
A. Standing
In the mid-1990s, I wrote an article asserting that “[i]t is hard to read any sig-
nificant number of cases or articles about standing without coming to the conclusion
that few hold the internal coherence of that doctrine in high regard.”73  I stand by those
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74 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between
two or more States . . . .
In United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974), the Court stated that the consti-
tutional requirements of standing derive from the case or controversy language of Article III.
75 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1982). In
Allen, the Court described standing as the most important concept in Article III. Allen, 468
U.S. at 750.
76 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
208–09 (1972) (concluding that Congress intended standing under section 810(d) of the Fair
Housing Act to extend as broadly as permitted under Article III).
77 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751–52.
78 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
79 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
80 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–31 (2007) (describing
such cases).
81 See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434–35 (1975).
82 Compare Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (standing existed for doctors to
challenge recent abortion statute passed in Georgia where it was “recent and not moribund”),
with Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503–06 (1961) (dismissing challenge to Connecticut statute
that prohibited the use of contraceptives on the ground that there was no Article III case or
words, but they need not deter me from the task at hand of describing what the courts
have written.  I focus specifically on the three elements of “constitutional” standing,
which are said to derive from the case or controversy provision of Article III of the
Constitution:74 injury in fact, causation, and redressability.75  There are also “prudential”
rules of standing, which do not derive from Article III, and which Congress can elimi-
nate if it so chooses.76
1. Injury “In Fact”
In describing the kinds of injuries that meet Article III requirements, the Court has
used terms like “distinct,” “palpable,” “not abstract,” not “conjectural or hypothetical,”77
“concrete,” “particularized,” and “actual or imminent,”78 although it generally con-
cedes that no precise definition is available.79  It is generally held that the imminent
possibility of prosecution under a law, or adjusting one’s behavior and abstaining from
constitutionally protected conduct in order to avoid prosecution, is an “injury in fact”
for standing purposes.80
Two issues related to the “injury in fact” element deserve mention.  First, courts
do require that there be a “credible threat” that the defendant will apply the law to the
plaintiff claiming injury from its potential application.81  However, the Court seems
to treat recently passed statutes differently from older statutes.82  While normally the
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controversy in the absence of a credible threat that state prosecutor intended to press criminal
charges under the law).
83 See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979) (hold-
ing that the plaintiffs had standing when defendants did not disclaim the right to prosecute them
in the future).
84 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
86 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
87 Roe, 410 U.S. at 166–67; see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 201.
88 Steffel, 415 U.S. at 455. Mr. Steffel alleged that he had stopped distributing the hand-
bills in response to the threats of arrest. A companion of his had not, and had been arrested.
Id. at 455–56.
89 Id. at 463.
90 Doran, 422 U.S. at 931.
91 Indeed, in Steffel, the Court did not reach the lower court’s holding that the prospec-
tive handbill distributor could not obtain injunctive relief. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 463 & n.12.
Footnote 12 appears to leave open the question whether an individual “required to forgo
constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid arrest” has shown irreparable injury. Id.
plaintiff must bear the burden of showing each element of standing, it appears that
the existence of a recently passed statute is sufficient to meet this burden.  For laws
other than ones in desuetude, the absence of a credible threat is something usually
raised and shown by the defendant, either with affidavits from the relevant parties
(indicating a lack of any intent to apply the law to the plaintiff) or by showing that
the law has never been applied in plaintiff’s situation.83
Second, even if a credible threat alone is sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction,
it is at least possible that more is required for injunctive relief.  The Court hinted at this
in several cases in the mid-1970s, Roe v. Wade,84 Steffel v. Thompson85 and Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc.86  In Roe v. Wade, the Court famously, albeit without much explanation
and without actually reaching the issue of the propriety of injunctive relief, affirmed
the denial of injunctive relief against the state prosecutors seeking to enforce Texas’s
abortion law even while it affirmed a declaratory judgment to the effect that the law
was unconstitutional.87  In Steffel, the Court held that a declaratory judgment action
was available to an individual who had previously been warned to stop distributing
handbills against American involvement in Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk of a shop-
ping center, and was threatened with arrest.88  The Court held that the handbill dis-
tributor could pursue his claim for declaratory relief even if he could not show the
irreparable harm that would be required for an injunction against prosecution.89  In
Doran, the Court suggested that injunctive relief might not be necessary in most cases
where a plaintiff’s rights can be protected through the use of a declaratory judgment.90
In neither Steffel nor Doran, however, did the Court explain in any kind of detail what
additional injuries or other considerations need to be shown in order to establish a
right to injunctive relief.91  While there may be a general perception that an injury
to one’s constitutional rights is “irreparable” injury entitling one, at least as an initial
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92 See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV.
687, 707 & n.100 (1990) (noting that “injunctions are the standard remedy in civil rights . . .
litigation” and citing 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 440 (1973), for the proposition that “when deprivation of a con-
stitutional right is shown, ‘most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is
necessary’”). This seems to be the rule for threats to First Amendment liberties. See, e.g., Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”). Whether it applies outside of
that context is not as clear. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 166 (refusing to reach question of the
propriety of district court’s denial of injunctive relief as to unconstitutional criminal statute
regulating abortion, noting that “[w]e are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to
abridge free expression, an area of particular concern . . . .”); Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned
Parenthood of the St. Louis Region v. Nixon, 428 F.3d 1139, 1143 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
as “far too broad” the assertion that any alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is irrepa-
rable injury); Constructors Ass’n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 820 n.33 (3d Cir. 1978)
(contrasting First Amendment and equal protection rights for purposes of irreparable injury).
93 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (“Certain types of injury, in par-
ticular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prose-
cution, could not by themselves be considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal sense of that
term. Instead, the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be
eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.”). The Court in Younger also
suggested that a “chilling effect” on First Amendment rights would be insufficient to allow
a federal court to interfere with a state criminal prosecution. Id. at 50.
94 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)) (ellipses and brackets as in Lujan).
95 Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[Plaintiff] has failed
to demonstrate the necessary causal connection between its injury [the loss of some minor
patients unable to obtain parental consent for abortions] and these defendants.”); Hope Clinic
matter, to injunctive relief,92 the Court has occasionally used language suggesting
that “irreparable harm” is a serious obstacle to obtaining injunctive relief.93
2. Causation
The second requirement of Article III standing is a showing of a “causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court.’”94  In recent appellate
court cases, where state laws enforced solely through lawsuits by private citizens were
challenged, the courts all have focused on the specific defendants before them and
concluded that those state officials had not engaged in any conduct—and were not
about to engage in any conduct—that caused the injuries to plaintiffs.  That is, they
have distinguished a “causal connection” between the state law and plaintiffs’ injuries
from one between specific state officials and plaintiffs’ injuries.  Each of the cases that
considered Article III standing, accordingly, found that the specific state officials were
not engaging in any conduct that could harm plaintiffs.95
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v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]laintiffs lack standing to contest the statutes
authorizing private rights of action . . . because the defendants cannot cause the plaintiffs injury
by enforcing the private-action statutes . . . .”); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426 (5th
Cir. 2001) (“The plaintiffs have never suggested that any act of the defendants [the Governor
and Attorney General of Louisiana] has caused, will cause, or could possibly cause any injury
to them. . . . [A] plaintiff may not sue a state official who is without any power to enforce the
complained-of statute.”).
96 See Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1979), wherein Shell Oil sued the
Governor and Attorney General of Rhode Island over a state law that precluded oil com-
panies from discriminating in price between purchasers of petroleum products of like grade
and quality. The law gave purchasers the right to sue for violations, but there were no criminal
sanctions associated with the laws being challenged. The First Circuit dismissed the lawsuit on
the ground that neither the Governor nor the Attorney General had ever taken or threatened
to take any action with respect to the statute in question, explaining that:
If a complaint fails to allege, or plaintiff fails to prove, that defendant
state officers have ever taken or threatened to take any action with re-
spect to a state statute then there is no ‘actual controversy’ within the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and there is ‘no case or controversy’ within
Article III.
Id. at 213. The court seemed largely influenced by the fact that any enforcement powers of the
Governor and Attorney General were speculative at best. Id. at 212–13 (although “not fanciful”
to suppose the state courts might interpret the law to provide such enforcement powers, they
“have not settled . . . those questions”).
97 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 170 (7th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Quinones v. City of Evanston, 58 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also 13A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.5 (3d ed. 2008)
(“The device of creating a purely civil remedy, enforceable only by an unidentifiable private
citizen in some unforeseen future, seems an undesirable means of thwarting effective review. . . .
Nonetheless, the majority [in Okpalobi] seems correct.”). Professor Manian argues that state
legislators are the parties that have harmed those seeking to perform or have legal abortions
when they pass laws so onerous in potential liability for such abortions that women and doc-
tors are chilled from exercising their rights. Maya Manian, Privatizing Bans on Abortion:
Eviscerating Constitutional Rights Through Tort Remedies, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 123, 165, 168–69
(2007). I address some of these arguments, infra, in Part IV.B.2.e.
98 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 753, 776 (2006).
Although these cases have caused some consternation in the academy, they are
not alone or without precedent.96  They apply the standard principle that “‘[a] person
aggrieved by the application of a legal rule does not sue the rule maker—Congress,
the President, the United States, a state, a state’s legislature, the judge who announced
the principle of common law.  He sues the person whose acts hurt him.’”97
Nonetheless, there have been academic critics.  Professor Borgmann, for example,
has assailed this causation analysis because, in her view, “focus[ing] on whether the
individual defendants had themselves caused the plaintiffs’ injuries . . .  is the wrong
approach to causation in these cases.”98  The individual defendants in these cases are
being sued “as representatives of the state itself” because it is the state itself which has
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99 Id. at 777.
100 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669–70
(1999) (recognizing that the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted such that states retain
their sovereign immunity in federal court); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
65 (1989) (concluding that states were not “persons” for purposes of § 1983).
101 Borgmann, supra note 98, at 778–79. An “abortion tort” statute is one where someone
injured by an abortion can sue for damages. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (2009).
Depending upon the abortions covered by the statute, such laws can raise issues under the
Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.
102 Professor Borgmann asserts that governors can be sued because they signed the bills
into law, and although legislators are immune from suit, governors are not. Borgmann, supra
note 98, at 778. She is wrong. When governors and other executives sign bills, they are acting
in their legislative capacities and have the same legislative immunity as legislators. See, e.g.,
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (declaring that a mayor signing a bill has absolute
legislative immunity); Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 612 (2007) (describing legislative immunity for governor when signing a bill); Women’s
Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 949 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).
As for attorneys general, Borgmann suggests that their role as the “state’s ‘chief legal
officer’” obligates them “to enforce and defend” state statutes, and that that role causes harm
to those wanting to engage in conduct that abortion tort law statutes make the basis of liability.
Borgmann, supra note 98, at 778–79 (quoting LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8). But, of course, the
salient point about tort law, generally, is that attorneys general do not enforce them. The one
case Professor Borgmann cites, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney General of Virginia, involved
a statute that specifically gave the attorney general the authority to “investigate and bring an
action.” 940 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-68.2 (1991)); see
Borgmann, supra note 98, at 779. Whether an attorney general’s general authority to defend
the constitutionality of a statute is sufficient by itself to cause harm to those who may be liable
under it is discussed infra, in text accompanying note 203.
caused the injury.99  Perhaps so, but one cannot sue the state itself under § 1983 or sue
it, without its consent or Congressional assistance, consistently with the Eleventh
Amendment in federal court.100  Professor Borgmann alternatively suggests that both
the governor of a state and its attorney general have caused, or will cause, the harm
to plaintiffs seeking to exercise their abortion rights in the face of the abortion tort
statutes, and thus can be sued.101  She is plainly wrong about the governor, and
probably about the attorney general as well.102
The more interesting questions involving causation concern situations where the
defendant cannot directly harm the plaintiff, but can do so indirectly.  As the Supreme
Court noted in Lujan:
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action
or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred . . .
in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether
the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action)
at issue. . . .  When . . . a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from
2010] CHALLENGES TO STATE ANTI-PREFERENCE LAWS 727
103 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).
104 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
105 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 13 (4th ed. 1983)).
106 Id.
107 Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he record
cannot support a conclusion that a judgment enjoining only these defendants from filing suit
to recover damages under § 1-740 would redress [plaintiff’s] injury [of turning away minor
patients seeking abortions who could not obtain parental consent]. . . . Most significantly, a
judgment in Nova’s favor would do nothing to prevent lawsuits against Nova by the minor
patients who actually require subsequent medical care, or by any doctors or non-defendant
hospitals and medical clinics who may treat them.”); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 605
(7th Cir. 2001) (“An injunction prohibiting these defendants from enforcing the private-suit
rules would be pointless; an injunction prohibiting the world from filing private suits would
be a flagrant violation of both Article III and the due process clause (for putative private
plaintiffs are entitled to be notified and heard before courts adjudicate their entitlements).”);
Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426–27 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that the redress-
ability requirement was not met: “For all practical purposes, the injunction granted by the
the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regu-
lation) of someone else, much more is needed.103
Some of the tricky issues associated with indirect injury, especially through a regu-
lation that governs the behavior of governmental actors, is discussed in subsequent
sections of this Article, including the next one on redressability.
3. Redressability
The Court has described the third constitutional requirement of standing, redress-
ability, as follows: “[I]t must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”104  The Court has noted that the
“‘fairly traceable’ [i.e., causation] and ‘redressability’ components of the constitu-
tional standing inquiry were initially articulated by this Court as ‘two facets of a single
causation requirement.’”105  The difference, the Court has explained, is that causation
“examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the
alleged injury, whereas [redressability] examines the causal connection between the
alleged injury and the judicial relief requested.”106
Thus, when privately enforceable tort laws are challenged, the cases have found
a lack of redressability for more or less the same reasons that they have found a lack
of causation.  The remedy against the state officials, be it an injunction or a declaratory
judgment, simply will not do the plaintiffs much good.  It certainly will not prevent
them from being sued in state court for violations of the underlying statutes.  Thus, to
the extent that the plaintiffs are injured by the chilling effect of the statutes, and the
possibility of state court lawsuits for substantial liability against them, an injunction
or declaratory judgment against, say, the attorney general of the state, will not prevent
that harm.107
728 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:709
district court is utterly meaningless. The governor and attorney general have no power to
redress the asserted injuries. In fact, under Act 825, no state official has any duty or ability
to do anything.”(footnotes omitted)).
108 E.g., Borgmann, supra note 98, at 781 (“Even if a private lawsuit were brought, a
declaratory judgment would help secure a quick victory for the defendants because a court
would likely find the prior determination of unconstitutionality persuasive.”); Manian, supra
note 97, at 142 (“[A declaratory judgment] could largely assure the doctors that they would
not face liability under the law for a medically proper and consensual abortion procedure.”).
109 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 469 (1974) (“‘Of course, a favorable declaratory
judgment may nevertheless be valuable to the plaintiff though it cannot make even an unconsti-
tutional statute disappear.’” (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))); Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727, 728 (10th Cir.
2006) (“There is no procedure in American law for courts or other agencies of government—
other than the legislature itself—to purge from the statute books, laws that conflict with the
Constitution as interpreted by the courts.”); Buck & Rienzi, supra note 71, at 425 (“Despite
such language used by courts and commentators, there is no such thing as ‘striking down.’ A
federal court has no power to erase a statute from a state’s lawbooks.”); Shapiro, supra note
71, at 767 (“No matter what language is used in a judicial opinion, a federal court cannot
repeal a duly enacted statute of any legislative authority.”).
110 See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 460.
111 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
112 It is fairly well-established that declaratory judgments do have res judicata effect for
the parties to the case and their privies. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971)
(explaining that a declaratory judgment would have “virtually the same practical impact as
a formal injunction would” because of its res judicata effect); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
The academic critics assert that declaratory judgments can, indeed, redress the
injuries caused by privately-enforced statutes that are allegedly unconstitutional be-
cause a declaration of unconstitutionality would give comfort to those being chilled
from exercising their constitutional rights, and thus give them the needed support to
engage in protected conduct.108  I believe they are wrong in this analysis, but an ex-
planation of why they are wrong requires a digression into the nature of declaratory
judgments and the relationship between federal and state courts.
Federal courts cannot erase state statutes (nor, for that matter, federal statutes).109
A declaratory judgment is designed to adjudicate the rights of parties with adverse
legal interests, i.e., where one side claims that they have a legal right to do some-
thing that may be affected by the other side, the other side disagrees about those legal
rights, and might otherwise try to prevent the declaratory judgment plaintiffs from
getting their way.110  An adverse legal interest is more than just a different opinion
about the law.  A fairly typical situation for a declaratory judgment is where an in-
sured is claiming that it is owed money on an insurance contract, and the insurer
denies that it is liable.  The insurer then brings an action for a declaratory judgment
that it is not liable under the insurance contract.111  In the context of a typical challenge
to a state criminal law, the defendant is a state prosecutor who can bring a prosecution
against a citizen for violating the law.  A declaratory judgment would be binding
against the state prosecutor pursuant to the principles of res judicata.112
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JUDGMENTS § 33 (1982); 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 97, § 2771; 22A AM.
JUR. 2D Declaratory Judgments § 246 (2003). But see Steffel, 415 U.S. at 470–71 (“‘[T]he
federal court judgment may have some res judicata effect, though this point is not free from
difficulty and the governing rules remain to be developed with a view to the proper workings
of a federal system. What is clear, however, is that . . . a declaratory judgment has the force
and effect of a final judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 . . . .’” (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 124–26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); cf. Shapiro, supra
note 71, at 763 (“Despite the doubts that have been expressed at the highest levels of the
federal judiciary, I think the [declaratory judgment plaintiffs’] plea of res judicata . . . should
be sustained.” (footnotes omitted)).
113 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
114 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120 (2007) (referring to “Article III’s
limitation of federal courts’ jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ reflected in the ‘actual
controversy’ requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act”); id. at 126–27 (“Our opinion
[in Aetna Life Ins.] explained that the phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the [Declaratory
Judgment] Act refers to the type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under
Article III.”); Aetna Life Ins., 300 U.S. at 240 (describing the Declaratory Judgment Act as
“operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense”).
115 Thus, it is literally true, but somewhat incomplete, to assert that “[r]edressability con-
cerns the court’s power, not the named defendants’ power, to redress the plaintiffs’ injury.”
Jennifer L. Achilles, Comment, Using Tort Law to Circumvent Roe v. Wade and Other Pesky
Due Process Decisions: An Examination of Louisiana’s Act 825, 78 TUL. L. REV. 853, 876
(2004). When the plaintiff is seeking forward-looking relief, the court’s power must be used
in such a way that the defendant’s ability to harm plaintiff’s interest in the future is affected.
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (“The plaintiff must show that
he ‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ . . . or threat
of injury . . . [and it] must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”
(quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 349 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969))).
116 If a successful declaratory judgment does not, on its own, change the behavior of the
defendant, a plaintiff can seek, and a court may order, injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(entitled to declaratory judgment “whether or not further relief is or could be sought”); id.
§ 2202 (“Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted . . . against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.”).
Cases for declaratory judgments in federal court, under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act,113 must still meet the requirement of Article III that limits federal courts
to hearing cases and controversies, which means that a federal court can only hear
declaratory judgment actions in which the plaintiff has standing.114  What this means
is that the judgment in the case will affect the behavior of the defendants in such a
way that plaintiffs’ injuries are “likely” to be redressed.115  A declaration might, for
example, identify certain conduct of the defendant that is illegal; the failure to acknowl-
edge that ruling could lead to an injunction being issued precluding that behavior.116
When the declaratory judgment action challenges a particular law that the defendants
could enforce against the declaratory judgment plaintiff, it is the res judicata aspect
of a declaratory judgment that provides the needed change in defendants’ behavior
required for the redressability component of Article III standing requirements: if the
plaintiff is successful, the defendants can no longer pursue legal claims against the
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117 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985) (stating that when a declaratory judgment
granted in federal court has a res judicata effect on the issue of liability in subsequent state
court proceedings, state courts are left only to determine restitution or damages).
118 See, e.g., id. at 73 n.2 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred action for a declar-
atory judgment regarding past conduct “[i]f . . . [plaintiffs seeking declaration regarding the
state’s improper calculations of earned income for purposes of calculating aid to families with
dependent children] would make no claim that the federal declaratory judgment was res
judicata in later commenced state proceedings, the declaratory judgment would serve no pur-
pose whatever in resolving the remaining dispute between the parties, and is unavailable for
that reason.” (citing Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952)));
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (explaining that if the declaratory judgment has
no res judicata effect, “‘the federal judgment serves no useful purpose as a final determination
of rights’” (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952)));
Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. Nev.-Cal. Elec. Corp., 111 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1940) (explaining
that a court lacks jurisdiction where the parties have stipulated that the declaration of certain
rights will not have res judicata effect); see also Shapiro, supra note 71, at 764 n.28 (“Professor
Borchard, one of the fathers of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 . . . viewed the
res judicata effect of a declaratory judgment as essential to its purpose and to its validity as
a judgment. . . . Were a declaratory judgment not entitled to res judicata effect, its validity as
an exercise of federal judicial power under article III of the Constitution might be suspect.”);
Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional
Dismissals after Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 212–13 (2001) (“The ability to bar such
a preclusive effect [of a judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act] is in direct tension
with the constitutional bar of the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III against federal
courts issuing purely advisory opinions. If declaratory judgments regarding the constitutionality
of applying a state criminal law to certain future conduct had no preclusive effect, then the
judgment would finally decide no controversy and be purely advisory.” (footnotes omitted)).
119 Borgmann, supra note 98, at 780–82.
120 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
121 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
122 See 13 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2006).
123 See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2006).
plaintiff.117  Without the possibility of res judicata (or the real possibility of the res
judicata effect being asserted in an actual subsequent lawsuit), an action for a declar-
atory judgment that a state statute is unconstitutional would usually be just a request
for an advisory opinion.118
In arguing that declaratory judgment actions can provide redressability, Professor
Borgmann focuses on declaratory judgment cases that have recognized plaintiffs’
standing where the defendants have not been the ultimate decision-maker, but have
had an important, perhaps near-dispositive influence, on the ultimate decision-maker.119
The most well-known of these cases involve the census, Franklin v. Massachusetts120
and Utah v. Evans.121  Under the statutes governing the taking of the census, the
Secretary of Commerce sends a report to the President concerning the number of
individuals in each state,122 and the President then makes a report to the Congress.123
In each of the census cases, a state objected to the method by which the Census
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124 In Franklin, Massachusetts also sued the President. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 790. The Court
concluded that the President was not an “agency” for purposes of the Administrative Procedure
Act. Id. at 800–01. Although it held that that fact did not preclude the Court from reviewing
the President’s actions for constitutionality, it nonetheless expressed some doubt as to whether
courts have any authority to enjoin the President in the performance of his duties, and chose not
to reach that issue. Id. at 801–03; see also Evans, 536 U.S. at 459 (“Utah brought this lawsuit
against the Secretary of Commerce and the Acting Director of the Census Bureau . . . .”).
125 Evans, 536 U.S. at 463–64 (“Victory would mean a declaration leading, or an injunction
requiring, the Secretary to substitute a new ‘report’ for the old one. Should the new report
contain a different conclusion about the relative populations of North Carolina and Utah, the
relevant calculations and consequent apportionment-related steps would be purely mechan-
ical . . . . [T]he practical consequence of that change [in the report to the President] would
amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that
directly redresses the injury suffered.”); Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 803 (plurality opinion)
(holding that although the Secretary’s decision was not the final agency action because her
report “serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination,”
declaratory relief against the Secretary would redress the State’s injury because the Secretary
“has an interest in defending her policy determinations,” an “interest in litigating its accuracy,”
and because presumably it was “substantially likely that the President and other executive and
congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute”).
Note that the Court in Evans seemed to have a considerably narrower interpretation of the
President’s discretion than the plurality in Franklin.
126 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (2000).
127 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978).
128 Id. at 77.
129 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
130 Id. at 169.
131 Id. at 170–71.
Bureau counted people and sued (among others) the Secretary of Commerce.124  In
each case, the Court concluded that the state’s “injury” was redressable by declara-
tory relief against the Secretary alone, even though the Secretary’s decision was not
final.125  Similarly, the Court has determined that a plaintiff had standing to sue the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act—
which limits the liability of nuclear power companies126—was unconstitutional.127  The
plaintiffs presented evidence that the nuclear power plants in their area would likely
no longer operate if the limits on liability from the Price-Anderson Act were unavail-
able.128  In another case, plaintiffs challenging an opinion of the Fish and Wildlife
Services that an endangered species would be jeopardized by continued operation of
a water reclamation project operated by the Bureau of Reclamation had standing to
challenge the legal propriety of that opinion even though it was not binding on the
Bureau.129  The Court found that the Fish and Wildlife Services’ opinion had a “power-
ful coercive effect”130 on the actions of the Bureau of Reclamation, and that the injury
to the plaintiff irrigation districts and ranchers (a diminution of water for them) would
likely be remedied by a declaration requiring withdrawal of the opinion.131
Two features of these cases deserve note.  First, the cases seem to require a non-
trivial amount of influence over the final decision-maker.  The Court in Bennett
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132 Id. at 169.
133 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568–71 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(stating that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an Endangered Species Act interpretation
by the Secretary of the Interior that limited a provision requiring other federal agencies to
consult with the Secretary to ensure that their actions would not be likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered or threatened species to domestic projects, and not
overseas projects, because (1) any determination by a district court would not be binding on
the other agencies because they were not parties to the action and (2) the agencies themselves
only supplied a small portion of the funding of the projects that allegedly would endanger
species, and thus there was no guarantee that less harm to species would be done if the
agencies’ contributions were withheld); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
42–43 (1976) (holding that where indigents alleged that changes in IRS policy allowed hos-
pitals to maintain their advantageous non-profit, tax-exempt status without providing adequate
medical services to the poor, plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show that the
desired change in IRS policy would lead to more medical services for indigents at tax-exempt
hospitals); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (holding that, in a challenge
by the mother of an illegitimate child to the failure of a prosecutor to seek criminal penalties
against the child’s father for non-support, the injury was the non-payment of support by the
father and that criminal prosecution of the father would not necessarily result in payment; it
might result in the father’s jailing).
134 See, e.g., Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating
“the principle that it must be the effect of the court’s judgment on the defendant that redresses
the plaintiff’s injury, whether directly or indirectly,” and that “Article III . . . requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress its injury
in fact” (citing Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868, 875 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added)).
distinguished situations where the injury is a consequence of the independent action
of some third party and an injury “produced by determinative or coercive effect
upon the action of someone else.”132  Of course, the distinction between the two
types of cases then depends upon the difference between determinative and less-
than-determinative effects, and that line will sometimes be less than clear.  The
Court has decided many cases in which the effect on third parties has been deemed
inadequate, and the Court has held that plaintiffs lacked standing.133  Second, it is
the defendant who must have a “determinative or coercive” effect upon the ultimate
decision-maker.  An injunction or declaratory judgment is intended to affect the
behavior of someone actually before the Court, even if that change in behavior will
not necessarily be dispositive of whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries can be prevented
or remedied.134  It is this second feature that distinguishes privately enforceable tort
statutes, where, the cases have held, the defendants simply will have nothing to do
with (and, thus, an inadequate connection to) the harm that is befalling the plaintiffs.
Accordingly, they cannot have a “determinative or coercive” effect on those actually
enforcing the statutes: state judges.
But even if we assume that “redressability” does not require that the defendant
have a substantial effect on the ultimate decision-maker, but is met if a federal court
judge (or a judgment one issues) has that kind of influence, that would hardly make
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135 See Borgmann, supra note 98, at 755, 769–71 (legislatures create a “chilling effect”
by “making it sufficiently costly to engage in targeted conduct . . . effectively suppress[ing]
the conduct”).
136 In abortion tort cases, “state courts stand in as a kind of shadow enforcer, because they
are implicitly charged with hearing the private lawsuits authorized by the statute. Absent state
court adjudication of these claims, the private lawsuits would carry no threat.” See id. at 778.
137 Professor Borgmann suggests that private plaintiffs would be deterred, relying on Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Franklin to the effect that a coercive judgment against a sub-
ordinate of the President’s (the Secretary of Commerce) and “an authoritative interpretation
of the census statute and constitutional provision” likely would influence the President and
other executive and congressional officials. Id. at 780–81 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992)). Suffice it to note that I have some doubt about Justice O’Connor’s
empirical observation and her characterization of any district court opinion as “authoritative”—
which is directly contrary to an observation by the Lujan plurality on the same topic. Lujan,
504 U.S. at 569. In any event, the executive branch of government is likely to give more weight
to the judiciary’s opinions than a private plaintiff (and/or a private lawyer on contingency)
seeking to recover damages would. Cf. Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1159–60 n.9 (“[T]here
is . . . nothing in the record to suggest any significant likelihood that other potential litigants
would consider themselves bound by a judgment to which they were not parties.”).
138 See Buck & Rienzi, supra note 71, at 429–34 (citing cases asserting that the judgments
of lower federal courts may be considered by or persuasive to state courts, but are not binding).
139 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[N]either federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state
court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”).
140 See, e.g., id. (“In our federal system, a state trial court’s interpretation of federal law
is no less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court
is located.”); R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1233 (8th Cir.) (“‘Federal courts (except
for the Supreme Court) are not superior to state courts, or higher in any theoretical order of
precedence.’” (quoting Richard S. Arnold, State Power to Enjoin Federal Court Proceedings,
51 VA. L. REV. 59, 71 (1965))), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983); United States ex rel.
Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075–76 (7th Cir. 1970) (citing various authorities to
the effect that state courts are coordinate courts with lower federal courts, on an equal footing
in their exposition of federal law), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); see also Shapiro, supra
note 71, at 771 (“Other federal courts [aside from the Supreme Court] are no more than coor-
dinate with the state courts on issues of federal law.”); id. at 774 (“The concept that state and
the “redressability” inquiry easier.  The injuries that federal court plaintiffs are suffer-
ing from privately-enforced statutes are caused by the threat of the civil lawsuits that
might cause the plaintiffs to incur substantial liability (thus, creating the “chilling
effect”).135  The actors most immediately connected to that harm are private plaintiffs
and state court judges.136  It is unlikely that private plaintiffs will be much affected by
a declaratory judgment in an action in which they were not parties.137  And state judges
are likely to give the opinions of lower federal courts as much weight as the arguments
used by the lower federal courts to support those opinions deserve.138  They have no
obligation to follow them.139
This is a crucial point.  State courts and lower federal courts are equal actors in the
exposition of federal law, including interpretations of the United States Constitution.140
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lower federal courts are coordinate courts on issues of federal law is one that, in my view,
is deeply rooted in the federal system.”).
141 The Court has hinted at this rule several times, but has not made any explicit holding.
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), for example, it characterized
an opinion of the Ninth Circuit suggesting the opposite rule as “a remarkable passage.” Id. at
58 n.11 (citing Yniquez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735–36 (9th Cir. 1991)). Several individual
Supreme Court Justices have stated that state courts are not bound. See Lockhart, 506 U.S. at
376 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal
law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state
court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”);
id. at 385 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Justice Thomas’s interpretation of
the Eighth Circuit opinion in the case and Thomas’s view that the opinion had suggested that
state courts were bound); Steffel v. Thomson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 n.3 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (explaining that a federal declaratory judgment would not have the same stare
decisis effect in state court that it would have had in a subsequent case in the same federal
jurisdiction). The federal circuit courts that have opined on the matter have expressed the
same view. See, e.g., Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 994 (9th Cir. 1997) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting) (citing authorities).
Perhaps most importantly, especially in the absence of any Supreme Court holding to
the contrary, the state courts themselves do not view themselves as bound. Id.; see Buck &
Rienzi, supra note 71, at 428–34 (“Numerous state courts, in fact, have held that they are not
bound by federal constitutional determinations except those of the Supreme Court.”); Michael
C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 283–84 n.219
(1994) (collecting authorities); Shapiro, supra note 71, at 771 (“[T]he state courts generally
believe, I think rightly, that the question whether to defer to lower federal court decisions
continues to be a matter of choice . . . .”).
142 Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1159 (“Even if these defendants were enjoined from
seeking damages against Nova . . . there would still be a multitude of other prospective liti-
gants who could potentially sue Nova under th[e] act. Most significantly, a judgment in Nova’s
favor would do nothing to prevent lawsuits against Nova by the minor patients who actually
require subsequent medical care, or by any doctors or non-defendant hospitals and medical
Accordingly, and although the matter has not been definitively ruled upon by the
Supreme Court, the majority, and perhaps even consensus, rule seems to be that state
courts are not bound by the holdings of lower federal courts.141  Thus, even if we only
consider the effect of a court’s conclusion and the legal reasoning used to reach the
result on those not parties to the case—aside from the absence of any effect on the
defendants’ behavior—redressability is at least questionable.  The federal court judges
before whom challenges to privately-enforced tort laws are brought were as powerless
as the defendants to stop private tort suits from going forward.
Hence, a declaration that a state law is unconstitutional will not immunize the
declaratory judgment plaintiff from liability for damages in state court.  Indeed, the
court in Nova Health Systems appeared to suggest that even if the state defendants
could enforce the abortion tort statute (for example, by suing for damages in state
court) it would not give plaintiffs standing because a declaration or injunction in
plaintiffs’ favor would not prevent others from suing them in state court.142  As a
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clinics who may treat them.”). The argument in Nova Health Systems that the state defen-
dants (the executives of various public medical institutions providing medical treatment)
were potential state court plaintiffs under the statute revolved around the contention that they
could incur unreimbursed medical costs as a consequence of an abortion performed on a minor
in violation of the statute. Id. at 1152. The court rejected that causation analysis because it
did not distinguish the hospital officials from anyone else who might sue under the statute.
Id. at 1157. The important point here is that the Tenth Circuit concluded that there would still
be a redressability problem even if it accepted plaintiffs’ causation theory. Id. at 1158–59.
143 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570–71 & 571 n.5 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (stating that redressability cannot be premised on the chance that the case may reach
the Supreme Court).
144 Id. at 571 n.5. I am not totally convinced by this analysis. There are many things that are
not known at the outset of a lawsuit, including whether the plaintiffs will win. Redressability
analysis asks whether a “favorable decision” is substantially likely to remedy the injuries
plaintiff has or will suffer. The Court has never really answered the question “favorable
decision by whom?” presumably because the answer is along the lines of “the last court to rule
after all appeals are waived or exhausted,” and no one has thought that it makes a difference
whether that last court is a district or circuit court, or the Supreme Court. It makes sense to me
to preclude the possibility of a Supreme Court opinion and judgment given the small likelihood
in any given case that the Supreme Court will be involved, but that analysis is a bit different
from the Lujan plurality’s analysis.
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
Although the literal text would only prevent suits against a state by citizens from another state
or aliens, the Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment reflects a broader principle that
also precludes citizens of a state from suing that state in federal court. Tenn. Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446 (2004); Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002).
matter of common sense, if substantial liability has a significant chilling effect on the
behavior of some actors, the fact that those actors have one additional non-binding
authority to cite in a lawsuit against them, or that one of many potential litigants could
not sue them, would not seem to provide much of a thaw.
Of course, one could argue that redressability can be met because any given
federal lawsuit might be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and everyone agrees that
Supreme Court decisions on federal law are binding.  The Supreme Court plurality in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife rejected a very similar argument, however.143  Accord-
ing to the plurality, standing must exist at the commencement of a lawsuit and “it
could certainly not be known that the suit would reach this Court.”144  At the very
least, then, the argument that redressability is met because the possibility of a Supreme
Court judgment would prevent plaintiffs’ injury is not an argument assured of success.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment precludes states from being sued without their consent
in federal court, by any persons, except under limited circumstances.145  One exception,
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146 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
147 E.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123).
148 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 132, 167.
149 Id. at 155–56.
150 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
151 Id. at 516.
152 Id. at 530.
If, because they were law officers of the State, a case could be made for
the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the statute, by an injunction
suit brought against them, then the constitutionality of every act passed
by the legislature could be tested by a suit against the Governor and the
Attorney General, based upon the theory that the former as the executive
of the State was, in a general sense, charged with the execution of all its
laws, and the latter, as Attorney General might, represent the State in
litigation involving the enforcement of the statutes. . . . [I]t is a mode
which cannot be applied to the States of the Union. . . .
Id.
derived from the Court’s opinion in Ex parte Young,146 permits certain suits seeking
prospective relief only against state officers sued in their official capacity.147
In Ex parte Young, the Court upheld, against a challenge that the suit itself vio-
lated the Eleventh Amendment, a lawsuit against the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota seeking to enjoin him from enforcing certain railroad rates imposed by state
laws that the suit alleged were unconstitutional for failing to provide an adequate return
on capital.148  Specifically, the Court, reviewing its past precedents, concluded that
individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some
duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and
who threaten and are about to commence proceedings . . . to en-
force against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating
the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of
equity from such action.149
In so doing, the Court distinguished its earlier decision in Fitts v. McGhee,150 which
involved an Alabama statute providing for certain maximum rates to be charged on a
certain bridge, wherein if a higher rate were charged or received, the person from
whom the higher rate was extracted could seek $20 from the person who violated the
statute.151  The Governor and Attorney General of Alabama were sued in Fitts, but the
Court held that the suit against them violated the Eleventh Amendment because they
did not “h[o]ld any special relation to the particular statute alleged to be unconstitu-
tional.”152  In Ex parte Young, the Court reaffirmed the principle of Fitts, but found
it inapplicable:
No officer of the State [in Fitts] had any official connection with
the recovery of such penalties [for toll overcharging]. . . . The fact
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153 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156–57. Thus, suing such representatives of the state was
equivalent to suing the state itself. Id. at 157 (lacking some connection with the enforcement
of the act, the defendant state officer is “merely [being made] a party as a representative of
the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party”); cf. Borgmann, supra note 98,
at 777 (“The plaintiffs in Okpalobi did not sue the state officials because of anything they did
as individuals. Rather, they sued them as representatives of the state itself.” (footnotes omitted)
(discussing Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. La. 1998))).
154 See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff may not
sue a state official who is without any power to enforce the complained-of statute.”); 1st
Westco Corp. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 6 F.3d 108, 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that state
officials must be dismissed from the suit where the school district and not the state officials
enforced the provision).
155 See, e.g., 1st Westco Corp., 6 F.3d at 113–16 (relying on Ex parte Young, the court
affirmed dismissal of school district’s third-party complaint against Pennsylvania officials
on Article III grounds, because it was the school district, and not the state officials, who
enforced the provision); Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614, 616–17 (4th Cir. 1982) (dismissing
Attorney General in challenge to state garnishment proceedings where he “ha[d] no state con-
stitutional or statutory obligation to defend a party, intervene in the action, or administer the
procedure in question”); McCrimmon v. Daley, 418 F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1969) (ruling that
a challenge to a law limiting employment of women as bartenders could not be maintained
against the Illinois Attorney General even though Illinois state law explicitly permitted local
jurisdictions to so limit the employment of women as bartenders—it was the local law that
actually created these restrictions, and the Illinois Attorney General did not enforce them).
156 See, e.g., Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing suit against
the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline challenging the Nevada Supreme Court’s rules
requiring confidentiality on complaints filed against judges, with a sanction of contempt as the
means to enforce that confidentiality rule, as a violation of the First Amendment, and stating
that “[o]nly the Nevada Supreme Court, which authored the rules but is not a party to this suit,
can do anything one way or the other about plaintiffs’ contempt chill”); Long v. Van de Kamp,
961 F.2d 151, 152 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing suit against California Attorney General chal-
lenging statute authorizing certain searches); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Brown, 651 F.2d 613,
614–15 (9th Cir. 1980) (dismissing suit against Oregon Attorney General challenging law
restricting the negotiation of settlements with injured employees because, even though the
Attorney General stipulated that he would advise local prosecutors that the law was consti-
tutional and that they would enforce it, he lacked authority to prosecute himself).
that the state officer by virtue of his office has some connection
with the enforcement of the act is the important and material fact,
and whether it arises out of the general law, or is specially created
by the act itself, is not material so long as it exists.153
This requirement of Ex parte Young, that the defendant have “some connection”
to the enforcement of the statute being challenged, is generally well accepted.154  It has
often been used simply to eliminate one or more, but fewer than all, defendants.155
The Ninth Circuit has used this requirement in a number of cases to dismiss the en-
tire lawsuit where it concluded that the defendant did not present and/or could not
present any threat to the plaintiffs.156
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157 Borgmann, supra note 98, at 791 (“[C]onnection appears to be subsumed by the ele-
ments required for Article III standing.”); Manian, supra note 97, at 171 (“‘some connection’”
requirement of Young “mimics the causation element of Article III standing”  (quoting Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157)).
158 See, e.g., 1st Westco Corp., 6 F.3d at 114–15 (“[A]lthough it is theoretically possible for
the [Pennsylvania Attorney General and Secretary of Education] to have initiated suit against
[plaintiffs’] interests, there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that two of the state’s
highest policy officials would have filed suit to rectify a statutory residency infraction by
seven construction workers in connection with a contract with a local school district.”); S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 651 F.2d at 614 n.2 (referring to Attorney General’s common law power to sue
for injunction, contention that Attorney General “could or would bring a civil suit to enjoin
violations [was] wholly speculative”); Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 213 (1st Cir. 1979)
(“Since . . . there is no showing that defendants intend to enforce [the challenged statutes] . . .
there is no actual controversy which this court is empowered by . . . Article III to adjudicate.”).
159 See supra text accompanying note 149.
160 See, e.g., Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region v. Nixon,
428 F.3d 1139, 1147–48 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Nixon did not threaten and was
not about to commence proceedings . . . nor did he have the ability to do so. . . . Because . . .
there is no actual case or controversy . . . we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of this
appeal.”), vacated, 550 U.S. 901 (2007); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 414–15 (5th Cir.
2001) (plurality opinion) (explaining that Ex parte Young permits suits against state officers
with a connection to the enforcement of, or a duty to enforce, a challenged act if they are
“threatening to exercise that duty”); Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters,
92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Courts have not read Young expansively. Young does
not apply when a defendant state official has neither enforced nor threatened to enforce the
allegedly unconstitutional state statute.” (internal citations omitted)), cert. denied sub nom.
Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Montgomery, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997); id. at 1416
(“[T]he phrase ‘some connection with the enforcement of the act’ does not diminish the
requirement that the official threaten and be about to commence proceedings.”); Long, 961
F.2d at 152 (“[U]nder Ex parte Young . . . there must be a threat of enforcement.”).
The similarity between the constitutional standing elements and the “some
connection” requirement of the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity is strong.157  Most obviously, a state official who cannot enforce a statute
in any meaningful sense both cannot cause any injury to plaintiff (and thus plaintiff’s
injury is not traceable to his or her conduct as required under Article III) and lacks the
“connection” requirement of Ex parte Young.  Courts also have occasionally com-
bined two of the elements of constitutional standing—the requirement that an injury
be “imminent” and not conjectural, and the requirement that the injury be traceable to
defendants’ conduct—into a sort of sliding scale in the Ex parte Young analysis: if
clever plaintiffs can point to some less-than-obvious method by which a defendant
might enforce the statute being challenged, courts sometimes require an indication
that the defendant actually intends to do so.158
There are also a few cases that suggest, adopting the “threaten and are about to
commence” language from Ex parte Young itself,159 that there must be a fairly real
threat of prosecution, and not merely the existence of a statute that could be the basis
of a prosecution, for the Ex parte Young exception to apply.160  If these cases are
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161 Cf. Aroostook Band of Micmacs v. Ryan, 404 F.3d 48, 65 (1st Cir. 2005) (“We have
recognized an imminence requirement in Ex parte Young actions, though the extent to which
it is jurisdictional (rather than just a substantive element of the action or a limit on equitable
discretion) may be subject to debate.”); cf. Nixon, 428 F.3d at 1145 (holding that Attorney
General was proper defendant under Ex parte Young in action challenging abortion regulation,
but preliminary injunction should not have been entered against him where prerequisites to any
enforcement by him, which were in the control of other actors, had not taken place); Summit
Med. Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1340 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992), discussed
Ex parte Young’s “imminence” requirement “only in the context of determining whether there
was sufficiently imminent and irreparable injury to support an award of injunctive relief” and
“never discussed the Eleventh Amendment or the Ex parte Young exception because it was
not at issue in the case”), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000).
162 Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1341–42. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, because
the appeal had come from a nonfinal order denying Eleventh Amendment immunity, it had
no appellate jurisdiction over the question of whether plaintiffs had Article III standing. Id.
at 1334–36.
163 Id. at 1341–42.
164 Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 423–24 (plurality opinion).
correct, it would be the case that the Ex parte Young exception requires a somewhat
stronger showing of “imminence,” or perhaps likelihood of injury, than Article III does,
although there is a question as to whether that somewhat stronger showing is actually
compelled by the Eleventh Amendment or whether it applies only to a court’s authority
to issue injunctive (as opposed to declaratory) relief.161  As I discussed earlier, the
“credible threat” requirement of Article III, especially with a recently enacted statute,
essentially places the burden on a defendant responsible for enforcing a law to show
that there is no likelihood of him or her prosecuting any violations by a plaintiff.
In the privately-enforced tort context, this possible distinction between the re-
quirements of Article III and the requirements of the Eleventh Amendment have had
little consequence because the defendants have had no ability to enforce the statute at
all.  The Summit Medical Associates decision in the Eleventh Circuit relied entirely
on the Eleventh Amendment in holding that plaintiffs could not challenge the private
civil enforcement provision of Alabama’s partial-birth abortion statute.162  Relying
heavily on Fitts v. McGhee, it held that the Eleventh Amendment barred that challenge
because only a husband or a maternal grandparent could enforce that provision.163
In Okpalobi, a plurality of seven (of fourteen) judges also concluded that (in addition
to plaintiffs lacking standing) the defendants—the Governor and Attorney General of
Louisiana—were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because they
did not enforce the tort law.164
IV.
We now are almost ready to consider the application of the justiciability and
immunity principles to challenges to anti-preference laws.  Before doing so, however,
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165 See infra Part II.A.
166 This has some relevance to the substantive arguments against the constitutionality of
the anti-preference laws. In Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, the court
addressed the First Amendment argument as follows: “It is not clear, for example, how the
Universities, as subordinate organs of the State, have First Amendment rights against the
State or its voters.” 473 F.3d 237, 247 (6th Cir. 2006), cert denied sub nom. Mich. Civil
Rights Comm. v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 129 S. Ct. 35 (2008).
167 See supra notes 119-131 and accompanying text.
168 Lemon v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, 1314–15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that a plaintiff who
alleged that the Secretary of the Army failed to comply with certain provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act and National Historic Preservation Act that required him to con-
sider the environmental and historic property impact before transferring certain property to
developers had standing. “Preparation of an environmental impact statement will never ‘force’
an agency to change the course of action it proposes. The idea behind NEPA is that if the
agency’s eyes are open to the environmental consequences of its actions and if it considers
options that entail less environmental damage, it may be persuaded to alter what it proposed.”).
I will briefly mention an obvious difference between anti-preference and some of the
privately enforceable laws that have been discussed previously, and discuss an addi-
tional standing issue related to the anti-preference laws that needs to be explored in
greater depth.
The difference between the pure tort statutes that are involved in many of the
cases we have examined and the anti-preference laws is straightforward.  Tort statutes
of the kind we have examined purport to regulate the conduct of private persons, for
the most part, and expose them to liability.  The anti-preference laws regulate the con-
duct of government agencies and expose them to liability.165  Private persons have
constitutional rights; the extent to which government agencies do is less than clear.166
As we shall see, this makes the standing calculation more complicated than in the
context of other privately enforceable laws.
A. Political Burdens and Procedural Rights
As noted previously, the Supreme Court has permitted lawsuits to proceed even
where the defendant cannot directly remedy the injury the plaintiff has or will suffer,
provided that the defendant will have a substantial influence on the person who can
provide that remedy.167  Related to the indirect injury cases are the “procedural rights”
cases.  In these cases, the plaintiff alleges that a government decision-maker failed to
follow the proper procedures in reaching a decision.  With such allegations, a plaintiff
is relieved of having to show that, had the decision-maker used proper procedures, it
would have made the decision that would remedy plaintiff’s substantive injury (similar
to the “substantial influence” cases, where plaintiff need not show that the ultimate
decision by a non-party definitely will be different).  The paradigmatic example is the
requirement that an environmental impact statement be drafted; if plaintiffs have a
concrete interest to protect, it does not matter that they cannot show that the drafting
of the statement would produce a different substantive result from the agency.168  In
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169 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). The caveat in Lujan was that the “procedural right”
claimed had to be for the purpose of protecting a concrete interest. Id; see Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they suffered
a procedural injury from the Forest Service’s rule that precluded notice and comment for cer-
tain of their projects because there was no specific project on which they would be able to
comment. “[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected
by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.”).
170 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568–69.
171 Id. at 569–71.
172 Id. at 571.
173 Id. at 572 n.7 (“[W]e do not rely, in the present case, upon the Government’s argument
that, even if the other agencies were obliged to consult with the Secretary, they might not have
followed his advice.”). Professor Sunstein’s discussion of Lujan in this regard is wrong. See
Sunstein, supra note 73, at 651 (“The plurality noted that even if the plaintiffs prevailed, and
the Secretary of the Interior determined that the funding was unlawful, the funding agencies
might not change their behavior.”).
174 524 U.S. 11, 13–14 (1998) (holding that parties seeking information about a lobbying
group, which FEC might seek if the group were a “political committee,” had standing to chal-
lenge FEC’s definition of “political committee,” which excluded lobbying group). Although
the FEC still had the discretion not to seek the information even if the lobbying group were
a “political committee,” the Court analogized the case to one where an administrative agency
had reached a conclusion by using the wrong standards. Id. at 25.
175 See Sunstein, supra note 73, at 652–53. Professor Sunstein argues that “procedural
rights” are not “special,” as the plurality in Lujan stated, but rather that the cases in which so-
called “procedural rights” are at issue are actually ones in which the injury itself needs to be
defined by the relevant law. Thus, in his view, if the “governing law also creates a legally
cognizable interest in the relevant structures and incentives,” then a decree requiring con-
formity with those structures and incentives remedies a real injury caused by the failure to
conform. Id. at 652; cf. Achilles, supra note 115, at 873 & n.152 (“Constitutional scholars have
this context, the plurality in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife noted that “[t]here is . . .
much truth to the assertion that ‘procedural rights’ are special.”169  In that case, there
were three links between the application of the requirement that federal agencies con-
sult with the Secretary of the Interior and the actual survival of threatened species:
(1) other federal agencies were not before the Court, and thus would not be bound by
any holding that the Secretary’s U.S.-only interpretation of the law was incorrect,170
(2) even if they were required to consult with the Secretary, they were not bound to
adhere to the Secretary’s view of whether their funding threatened any species,171 and
(3) even if they agreed with the Secretary, and withdrew funding from foreign-based
projects, it was no guarantee that the projects would not proceed or that endangered
species would fare better.172  As to the second link, though, the plurality concluded that
plaintiffs were alleging the violation of a “procedural right” (i.e., the right to have
federal agencies consult with the Secretary), and specifically disclaimed any reliance
on the weakness of that link.173  Although it never mentioned the phrase “procedural
rights,” a majority of the Court appeared to adopt this view in FEC v. Akins.174
An analogy can be drawn between the “procedural rights” cases and cases
alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause.175  At least since Heckler v.
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often noted that redressability is highly dependent upon how the court defines the plaintiffs’
injury.”); Manian, supra note 97, at 166 (“[S]tanding doctrine is easily manipulated depending
on how the injury is characterized.”).
176 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
177 Id. at 735, 739–40 (standing recognized for male plaintiff who challenged policy whereby
widowed women, but not widowed men, were entitled to certain social security benefits even
though Congress provided that, should the differential treatment be deemed unconstitutional,
it should be remedied by elimination of the benefits to women and not extension of the benefits
to men. The Court concluded that “discrimination itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereo-
typic notions’ or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ and
therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious noneconomic
injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their
membership in a disfavored group.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Ne. Fla. Chapter
of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 658, 666
(1993) (standing existed for contractors’ association to challenge “preferential treatment to
certain minority-owned businesses in the award of city contracts” regardless of whether “one
of its members would have received a contract absent the ordinance”; “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ . . .
is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate
inability to obtain the benefit”).
178 See supra Part I.
179 As Professor Sunstein has noted, “it has yet to be explained why, in principle, there is
no serious problem [of redressability] in conventional administrative law cases. We know that
there is no such problem; we do not know why.” Sunstein, supra note 73, at 648.
Mathews,176 the Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the right
to be treated equally, regardless of whether the plaintiff will be able to procure a
benefit from the equal treatment.177  Thus, at least for those cases alleging an on-
going violation and for which prospective relief is sought, plaintiffs’ standing does
not depend upon their ability to obtain the ultimate relief sought.
As with the Equal Protection Clause generally, so too with the specific arguments
used to challenge the anti-preference laws.  As described earlier, the arguments on
which we have focused do not challenge, for the most part, actual race-neutral con-
duct.178  At least arguably, they challenge the process by which a state entity arrives
at the decision to engage in race-neutral conduct.  On this theory, and with some
substantial oversimplification, the state entity is burdened by the obligations of state
law in making its decision about whether to adopt a policy of race neutrality.  That
burden injures plaintiffs’ “procedural right” to have the race-conscious versus race-
neutral policy question decided on the lowest possible level of government, without
the political burden imposed from higher levels.
While this characterization of the anti-preference arguments might be plausible,
it is by no means guaranteed to provide standing.  The Court simply has not been
terribly clear about what rights can be “procedural rights,” and whether they apply
at all outside of specific contexts.179  After all, Linda R.S. could also be described as
a “procedural rights” case—in the specific instance, plaintiff’s case would be about
prosecutors making prosecutorial decisions about bringing criminal charges against
deadbeat dads without interference from an unconstitutional interpretation of state
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180 “The Texas courts ha[d] consistently construed [the relevant criminal] statute to apply
solely to the parents of legitimate children and to impose no duty of support on the parents
of illegitimate children.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 615 (1973). The plaintiff
sought an injunction precluding the prosecutor in question from declining to prosecute solely
on the basis of that interpretation of state law. Id. at 616.
181 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
182 Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1490 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (listing
various entities as plaintiffs, including the lead plaintiff Coalition for Economic Equity,
California NAACP, AFL-CIO, Council of Asian American Business Associations, and La
Voz Chicana, as well as “several named individuals”), vacated, 122 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997).
183 Id.
184 Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96-4024, 1996 WL 788376, at *1 n.1, *2 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 16, 1996). Not all the defendants put up a struggle against plaintiffs’ claims. The City
of San Francisco, for example, essentially agreed with plaintiffs that the constitutional amend-
ment added by Proposition 209 was unconstitutional. Id. at *2; Coal. for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the City and County of San Francisco,
as well as Marin County, filed emergency motions for a stay of the mandate from the Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion that the challenged provision of the California Constitution was consti-
tutional, despite the fact that they were “not parties to the appeal”);  Coal. for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 697 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that San Francisco and other defendants
did not appeal preliminary injunction and filed briefs in favor of plaintiffs). “Other defendants
expressed uncertainty and confusion regarding the appropriate response to the initiative.”
Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1495 (citing Response of Defendant City of Pasadena to Plaintiffs’
Request for a Temporary Restraining Order at 2).
law.180  Similarly, Edwards v. Aguillard181 could be viewed as a case in which the
State improperly imposed its view of proper teaching balance upon teachers, thus
making the teachers’ decisions as to what to teach procedurally improper.  But the
fact is that the courts do not generally recharacterize such cases as ones involving
“procedural rights,” and whether they would do so in a challenge to an anti-preference
law cannot be predicted.
B. Standing for the Anti-preference Law Challenges: Whom Do You Sue?
This section considers the standing of possible plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit chal-
lenging an anti-preference law on one or more of the grounds suggested in Part I.  Of
course, the defendants who might be sued, and whether plaintiffs have standing to sue
them, will depend to a certain degree on who the plaintiffs are and what they claim
their injury to be.  In the challenge to California Proposition 209, the plaintiffs were
various entities and a few individuals.182  They represented a certified class consisting
of “all persons or entities who, on account of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin, are or will be adversely affected by Proposition 209’s prohibition of affirmative
action programs operated by the State [or any of its subdivisions].”183  The defendants
were various officials of the State of California, including the Governor and Attorney
General, the President of the University of California, and various cities and counties.184
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185 Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1490 n.6. The class was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The propriety of certifying a defendant class pursuant
to that rule is less than clear. Rule 23(b)(2) provides for certification when “the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(2). Thus, for a defendant class to be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), one would
have to show, somewhat counterintuitively, that the plaintiff has acted or refused to act on
a ground generally applicable to the class of defendants. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 97, at § 1775 (discussing split of authority and opining that the “better view”
is that 23(b)(2) does not authorize certification of defendant classes).
186 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
924, 933–34 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“The Cantrell plaintiffs exclusively challenge Proposal 2 as
it is applied to Michigan’s public universities, and the University of Michigan in particular. . . .
Like the Cantrell plaintiffs, the Coalition plaintiffs focus principally, if not exclusively, on
Proposal 2’s impact on public universities.”).
187 Id. at 947 (describing the organizational plaintiffs).
188 Id. at 933–34. The court eventually denied the motions for class certification as moot.
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 960, 964,
974 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
189 See Plaintiff Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action et al.’s (BAMN’s) Second Amended
Class-Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 8, Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d
924 (No. 06-15024), 2007 WL 1316641.
190 See Order Granting Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene and Directing Response
to Motion for Preliminary Injuction at 2–3, Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d 924 (No. 06-15024).
191 See First Amended Complaint at 11, Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d 924 (No. 06-15637),
2007 WL 4594899. Although the Attorney General was not sued in the initial complaint in
this action, or mentioned in the caption of the amended complaint, he was identified as a
“Defendant Intervenor” in the amended complaint. Id. at 11 para. 29.
192 Order Dismissing Coalition Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint Against Governor
Jennifer Granholm at 1, Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d 924 (No. 06-15024); Order Dismissing
The court further certified a defendant class consisting of “all state officials, local gov-
ernment entities or other governmental instrumentalities bound by Proposition 209.”185
In short, the lawsuit was a challenge to virtually every possible application of the
constitutional amendment.
In contrast, the challenge to the anti-preference law in Michigan was much
narrower.  Two consolidated cases challenged the application of that law, article 1,
section 26 of the Michigan Constitution, to three of Michigan’s universities.186  The
plaintiffs, for the most part, were individuals with some connection to one of the
three universities, or groups that had such individuals, or those who wanted to support
race-conscious policies at those universities, as members.187  They wanted to represent
classes of present and future students and faculty, or citizens who wanted to support
race-conscious decision-making, at the three specific universities.188  Plaintiffs in one
case sued the Governor, the Attorney General, and various trustees and/or directors of
the three universities,189 although the Attorney General actually had entered the case
through a motion to intervene.190  Plaintiffs in the other case sued only the Governor
and the Attorney General.191  The Governor was subsequently dismissed from both
actions pursuant to stipulations.192
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Cantrell Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Against Governor Jennifer Granholm Only at
1, Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d 924 (No. 06-15637); Stipulation Dismissing Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, et al’s Second Amended Complaint Against Defendant Governor
Granholm, Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d 924 (Nos. 06-15024 and 06-15637), 2007 WL 4594859.
193 Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47; Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp.
1480, 1491–92 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963
(1997). Only Wilson addressed whether the provision was being “enforced.” Id. at 1491–92
(“Proposition 209 . . . is virtually certain to be enforced. The amendment was recently enacted
and is not a statute that has lain dormant for years and likely to remain moribund.”).
194 Regents, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 924; Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1519. Wilson, curiously, did not
identify any injuries during its discussion of standing, but only in describing the “irreparable
injury” needed for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1491–92.
195 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. One could argue that petitioning govern-
ment is a constitutionally-protected right, protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, it is. But
the anti-preference laws do not preclude anyone from exercising that right in the same sense
that a law criminalizing certain kinds of protected speech precludes those who would engage
in the speech from exercising their right to free speech.
1. Injury in Fact and Threat of Enforcement
As described above in Part III.A.1, the requirement for an “imminent injury” when
a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a new state law is fairly low.  If plaintiffs
allege that the law in question has precluded them from engaging in protected conduct,
or otherwise affected their behavior, that should be enough short of a statement by
defendants that they do not intend to utilize the law.  Indeed, even if defendants were
to make such a statement—altogether plausible if they actually have no ability to en-
force the law—it is unclear whether that would be sufficient if the law provided for
enforcement by private individuals.  The challenges to tort statutes generally conclude
that plaintiffs alleged an injury in fact, and the challenge to California’s and Michigan’s
anti-preference laws reached a similar conclusion.193  Injuries identified have included
greater difficulty in gaining admissions to a university, heightened difficulty in secur-
ing legislation or policies that inure primarily to minorities, and hindrance of the right
to full participation in the political life of the community.194
However, as also described above, while an “injury in fact” derived solely from
the existence of an anti-preference law may be sufficient for Article III standing, there
are other, related justiciability and remedial issues that might require a higher level of
proof.  Some cases interpreting the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity suggest that there needs to be an actual threat of enforcement by the defen-
dant state official, and not merely the existence of a statute.195  Other cases suggest a
higher standard for the irreparable harm needed for injunctive relief, and it is not clear
whether the inability to lobby a lower level governmental entity would constitute such
irreparable harm.196
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197 See, e.g., Harris v. Bush, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276–77 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (“Article IV,
§ 1 of the Florida Constitution vests Governor Bush with executive power to enforce the laws.”).
198 See, e.g., Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 949 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“A governor’s ‘general executive power’ is not a basis for jurisdiction in most circumstances.
If a governor’s general executive power provided a sufficient connection to a state law to
permit jurisdiction over him, any state statute could be challenged simply by naming the gov-
ernor as a defendant.”); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988) (dismissing
Governor from lawsuit was proper because there was no “realistic potential” that his “general
power to enforce the law would have been applied” in this case  (internal citations omitted));
Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp. 1148, 1151–52 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding insufficient Governor’s
authority under state law “to ‘take care that the laws are faithfully executed’” to render him an
appropriate defendant in a case challenging a state law governing divorce procedures (citing
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3). “[T]his would extend Ex parte Young beyond anything which the
Supreme Court intended or has subsequently held.”).
199 An executive order in Florida precluding the use of race-conscious decision-making
for state universities apparently has never been challenged in court. See generally TERRY H.
ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 261–62 (2004)
(describing the history of the “One Florida” plan).
2. Causation/Traceability
In determining whether a plaintiff can meet its obligation to show a causal relation-
ship between defendants’ conduct and the injury that the plaintiff will suffer, I will
approach the problem by considering the various possible defendants in a lawsuit chal-
lenging an anti-preference law.  Since it is related, I will also consider whether the
particular defendant’s ability to “enforce” a state statute meets the requirements of Ex
parte Young and the Eleventh Amendment.  The discussion here will have to be broad:
whether there is causation or enforcement ability will depend upon the nature of the
suit and the specifics of state law (that is, what powers various state officials have).
a. Governor
Starting at the top, plaintiffs might sue the state’s governor.  A governor is
frequently said to be the state’s chief law enforcement officer, and usually has some
general obligation to enforce state law.197  But, as we have seen previously, the general
obligation to enforce state law, without some particular connection to the enforcement
of the specific law being challenged, is usually not enough.198
Governors may have other relevant powers.  For example, they are the chief
officers of a branch of government and may have direct control over the employees of
that branch.  An order requiring all subordinates of the governor to act in a racially-
neutral way might indeed be “enforcing” an anti-preference law in some way.  With
respect to this kind of “enforcement,” one suspects that the more serious problem
is whether the Hunter-Seattle argument, or the Title VII preemption argument, can
really be extended to branches of the executive department of the state government
that are subject to the governor’s authority.199
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200 The district court did not assess whether the Governor actually had any litigating
authority, or merely professed to have such authority. Compare Coal. for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (referring to state court litigation in
which the Governor intended to invoke Proposition 209 against the programs of certain state
agencies), with People ex rel. Dep’t of Conservation v. El Dorado County, 116 P.3d 567, 573
(Cal. 2005) (noting that a state official needed to have some “special interest” to have standing
to seek a writ of mandate). But cf. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 15–16 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (describing litigation that challenged various California laws as violative of
equal protection and Proposition 209 that was commenced by Governor Wilson and taken over
by taxpayers after Wilson left office).
201 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
202 See Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1413, 1416,
1418 (6th Cir. 1996) (dismissing Attorney General on Eleventh Amendment grounds from
an Establishment Clause challenge to state law permitting parents to seek care for their children
through “spiritual means,” and concluding that “[h]olding . . . a state official’s obligation to
execute the laws [as] a sufficient connection to the enforcement of a challenged statute would
extend Young beyond what the Supreme Court has intended and held”), cert. denied sub nom.
Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Montgomery, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997); 1st
Westco Corp. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 6 F.3d 108, 113–14 (3d Cir. 1993) (dismissing school
district’s third-party claim against state Secretary of Education and Attorney General where
construction company sued local school district for enforcing a state statute requiring school
districts to ensure that all laborers on public construction projects be residents of Pennsylvania.
“[A]lthough Ex Parte Young allows a party to be joined to a lawsuit based solely on his or her
general obligation to uphold the law, it is appropriate only in cases in which there is a ‘real, not
ephemeral, likelihood or realistic potential that the connection will be employed against the
plaintiff’s interests.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208)); Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457, 460
(2d Cir. 1976) (dismissing Attorney General as a party and holding that, “[a]lthough he has a
duty to support the constitutionality of challenged state statutes and to defend actions in which
the state is ‘interested’, the Attorney General does so, not as an adverse party, but as a represen-
tative of the State’s interest in asserting the validity of its statutes” (internal citations omitted));
Gras, 415 F. Supp. at 1151 (dismissing Attorney General in challenge to the state law that per-
mitted wife to seek interim fees from husband during a divorce litigation, but had no analogous
Finally, a governor may have some authority as a litigant to seek conformity with
the state law.  The district court in the litigation over California’s anti-preference
law relied to a significant degree on Governor Wilson’s litigation position against
agencies subject to the anti-preference law.200  Whether other states’ governors (or,
for that matter, California’s) have such litigating authority will depend solely on state
law.  As noted previously, the Governor of Michigan was dismissed by stipulation
in the action governing that state’s anti-preference law.201
b. Attorney General
Just as the position of a governor as the state’s nominal chief law enforcer is
inadequate to meet the justiciability requirements we have encountered, so, too, the
general authority of a state attorney general to enforce the state’s law is usually
deemed inadequate.202  The fact that an attorney general is obligated to defend the
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provision for husband to seek interim fees from wife, holding that “[t]he Attorney General
has no interest in the outcome of a divorce suit and no duty to enforce any order made in it”).
203 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (holding the fact that “‘attorney general might
represent the State in litigation involving the enforcement of its statutes’” was insufficient
to overcome bar of Eleventh Amendment (quoting Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530
(1899))); 1st Westco Corp., 6 F.3d at 114 (noting that because the Attorney General had opined
to Secretary of Education that law requiring employees of contractors of school districts to
be residents should be enforced did not make him a proper defendant, and explaining that “the
act of issuing an opinion about an abstract constitutional issue falls far short of enforcing, or
threatening to enforce, a statute against a specific party”); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Brown, 651
F.2d 613, 614 (9th Cir. 1980) (deciding that in a challenge to a law limiting employers’ ability
to negotiate settlements with injured employees, the fact that the Attorney General would
advise district attorneys to presume the act constitutional and his stipulation that the district
attorneys would enforce the act unless constrained, was insufficient to maintain a claim against
him); Mendez, 530 F.2d at 460 (holding Attorney General’s “duty to support the constitu-
tionality of challenged state statutes” and “to defend actions in which the state is ‘interested’”
was insufficient to make him a proper defendant in an action challenging the residency require-
ment for divorce); Gras, 415 F. Supp. at 1151.
204 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
206 Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon,
428 F.3d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding, in a challenge to an “informed consent” law for
abortion services, that where the Attorney General could aid prosecutors only when directed
by the Governor and could sign indictments only when directed by the trial court, he was a
proper defendant under Ex parte Young; without any indication that the Governor or trial
court had taken any action that would lead to enforcement action on his part, the preliminary
injunction issued against him was vacated), vacated on other grounds, 550 U.S. 901 (2007).
constitutionality of a state law, or even has given an opinion upholding its constitu-
tionality, is not sufficient to say that he or she is enforcing the law.203  Indeed, even the
possibility that the attorney general could enforce the law directly in litigation has
been held insufficient if the method of litigation is either contingent or uncertain.204
This last point might be relevant in states such as Michigan, where the Attorney
General has some litigating authority, but it is entirely dependent on another person
or entity: in the case of Michigan, upon the decisions of the Michigan Department
of Civil Rights or the Michigan Civil Rights Commission.205  That is, the Article III
causation requirement and the “some connection” requirement of Ex parte Young are
usually found to have been met where a prosecutor or Attorney General can make his
or her own decision to litigate.  Even if the contingent nature of the Attorney General’s
authority is not sufficient to render him or her an inappropriate defendant, it might
affect the nature of relief that can be afforded.206
c. State Judges
At first glance, suing state judges might seem like a waste of time because of
judicial immunity.  But the Supreme Court held in Pulliam v. Allen that judicial
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207 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984). But see Borgmann, supra note 98, at
778 (“[J]udges are immune from suit.”).
208 Nollet v. Justices of the Trial Court of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000).
209 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”); see also Brandon E.
v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the amendments to § 1983 in the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996).
210 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908).
211 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982).
212 See, e.g., Brandon E., 201 F.3d at 198 (“The seminal case on the subject is In re Justices
of The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.”); Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146, 147–48 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“The leading authority is In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico”). It is not entirely
clear why In re Justices is considered the “leading” authority since it relied upon two earlier
decisions, Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976), and Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp.
1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22.
213 In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 18–19.
214 Id. at 18.
215 Id. at 25.
immunity does not apply to claims for prospective injunctive relief.207  While
Congress reacted to Pulliam by amending § 1983208 (albeit some twelve years later),
it only limited the availability of injunctive relief against judges in § 1983 claims, not
declaratory relief.209
Nor have the federal courts precluded suits against state court judges by citing
Ex parte Young, although that case surely laid the groundwork for such a limit when
it stated:
[T]he right to enjoin an individual, even though a state official,
from commencing suits . . . does not include the power to restrain
a court from acting in any case brought before it, either of a civil
or criminal nature . . . . [A]n injunction against a state court would
be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.210
Rather, the lower courts have come to the rescue of their state court compa-
triots by interpreting § 1983 as precluding claims against state court judges in their
“adjudicative” capacities.  Then-Judge Breyer’s 1982 opinion for the First Circuit in
In re The Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico211 is considered the leading
authority.212  The question in the underlying lawsuit was whether various require-
ments of the integrated bar in Puerto Rico (e.g., the fact that lawyers had to join the
bar association and give it financial support to practice in Puerto Rico) violated the
United States Constitution.213  The Puerto Rico Bar Association, a related foundation,
and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico were named as defendants.214
The First Circuit granted a mandamus petition by the judges arguing that the district
court had no jurisdiction over them.215  The factors set forth by Judge Breyer were
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216 Id. at 21; see also Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing the factors
from In re Justices).
217 See Manian, supra note 97, at 170 n.243 (“The reason [for dismissal of state court
judges] is not because of judicial immunity, but because of standing.”). Alas, it would be
more accurate to say that standing should be the reason.
218 Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008) (“A criminal conviction in the
usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and
committed to procedures designed to ensure its own independence.”).
219 In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22–23 (“[L]ike the Second Circuit [in Mendez v. Heller] and
Judge Friendly [in Gras v. Stevens], we are reluctant to rest our decision directly on Article III
when the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis. . . . By joining in this interpretation
of § 1983, we avoid the constitutional problems that might be raised by a more expansive appli-
cation of the statute. We avoid explicitly finding that Congress could not make judges proper
parties in cases such as this one should it choose to do so, and we avoid the constitutional
snares that might otherwise be posed by similar, but distinguishable, cases.” (internal citations
omitted)). Judge Breyer’s reliance on earlier precedents is questionable. The court in Mendez
v. Heller concluded that “as between appellant and [state court judge], this case does not pre-
sent the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights’ ‘indispensable to adjudication of
constitutional questions.’” 530 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing two Supreme Court cases
regarding collusive lawsuits) (internal citations omitted). Although the First Circuit “inter-
pret[ed] Mendez . . . as holding that under the circumstances present in th[at] case[ ], judges
were not proper party defendants in § 1983 actions challenging the constitutionality of state
statutes,” In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22, the foregoing quote from Mendez does not, in my
view, compel that interpretation, and is more readily interpreted as a holding that there was
no case or controversy.
220 In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 25.
the facts that judges sit as arbiters without a personal or institutional stake on either
side of the constitutional controversy (and are sworn to uphold the United States
Constitution); that they have played no role in the statute’s enactment; that they have
not initiated its enforcement; and that they do not have an institutional interest in
following their own precedents if a contrary authoritative legal determination has
been made.216
All of that sounds like the absence of a case or controversy.217  To allow litigants
to sue state court judges on the ground that they will enforce a state law violative of the
United States Constitution suggests that the state court judges have prejudged the con-
stitutional question.218  Since their obligation to apply the United States Constitution
is no less than that of federal court judges, the likelihood of them enforcing the statute
against the federal court plaintiff is at best unclear, and likely inadequate.
Unfortunately for the clarity of the law, Judge Breyer did not rely upon Article III.
Rather, in order to avoid any constitutional issues and a finding that would have pre-
cluded Congress from authorizing a suit against state judges, the First Circuit relied
upon an interpretation of § 1983.219  (The court nonetheless invoked its mandamus
jurisdiction: “Our decision here, while formally resting on the plaintiffs’ failure to
state a claim, is so influenced by Article III-type jurisdictional considerations that it
falls within the scope of our traditional mandamus authority.”) 220  Other circuit courts
2010] CHALLENGES TO STATE ANTI-PREFERENCE LAWS 751
221 See, e.g., Brandon E. v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2000); Grant v. Johnson,
15 F.3d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1994); R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1232 & n.10 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983). But see Bauer, 341 F.3d at 361 (dismissing state court
judge because “there [was] no case or controversy under Article III and [state judge was] not
a proper party under section 1983”). See also Manian, supra note 97, at 170 n.243.
222 Subsequently, the 1996 amendments to § 1983 suggest that judges “in [their] judicial
capacity” can be sued for declaratory relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Presumably, “judicial”
capacity is a category broader than “adjudicative” role; otherwise, the logic of In re Justices
and its progeny would essentially preclude the possibility of declaratory relief against judges
and render the amendment in 1996 meaningless.
223 See, e.g., Nollet v. Justices of the Trial Court of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211 (D. Mass.
2000) (concluding that state judges acting in their adjudicative capacity could not be sued
under § 1983 because their conduct was not state action). This is almost certainly wrong.
See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 n.1 (1984) (“The actions of state courts and
judicial officers in their official capacity have long been held to be state action governed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
224 Shapiro, supra note 71, at 762 n.22 (“Injunctions against state judicial officers are not
unknown. But they are certainly not the norm.” (internal citation omitted)).
225 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)
 (“[R]estraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by
an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.”).
Professor Shapiro has argued persuasively that both the doctrines of offensive collateral
estoppel and the use of class actions must be tempered by the need to allow state courts to fulfill
their functions as coordinate expositors of federal law. Shapiro, supra note 71, at 773–74,
778–79. Similarly, suits against state judges might be disfavored for precisely the same reason.
226 Cf. Bauer, 341 F.3d at 358 (holding that an individual for whom defendant judge had
appointed a temporary guardian did not have standing to challenge the Texas law permitting
such appointments in a lawsuit against the judge. Because “there have been no such proceed-
ings since November 2001, and [the state guardianship proceeding] was transferred from
[defendant judge] to Judge Wood, there does not exist a ‘substantial likelihood’ and a ‘real and
immediate’ threat that [plaintiff] will face injury from [defendant judge] in the future.”).
have followed suit in eschewing Article III as a basis for dismissing judges acting in
their adjudicative capacities.221  I deem this unfortunate because Judge Breyer never
pointed to anything in the text or history of § 1983 that precludes a suit against state
judges acting in their adjudicative capacities,222 and that glaring absence has led to
some unusual holdings by those courts that have followed In re Justices.223
Certainly, there is a strong reluctance to drag state court judges into federal court,
the limits of judicial immunity notwithstanding.224  It cuts against the general belief
of equivalence between state courts and lower federal courts in interpreting federal
law and the respect that each owes the other.225  When the challenge is to a law that
has just been passed, there is the additional question of whether any particular judge
will even be assigned a lawsuit in which a litigant seeks to enforce the law.226
752 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:709
227 See supra Part II.A.
228 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7–13 (1982).
229 See, e.g., Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1063 (9th Cir.) (“Prosecutors routinely take
an oath of office when they become stewards of the executive power of government. That oath
uniformly includes a promise at all times to support and defend the Constitution of the United
States.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002).
230 Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116–19 (1975) (holding a prosecutor’s finding of
probable cause to issue an information and detain the accused until trial could not substitute
for a probable cause finding from a neutral magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes).
But it is still not completely clear why a judge who has already opined on the
federal constitutional question, rejected any constitutional infirmity in the state law,
has enforced it in the past, and has jurisdiction to enforce it in the future would not
be an appropriate defendant simply because he will act in his adjudicative capacity
in the future.  One can only assume that some or all of the factors mentioned in the
last paragraph have something to do with the fact that courts do not seem favorably
disposed to such lawsuits.
d. Civil Rights Executives and/or Commissioners
Many states have executive branch agencies and/or special commissions designed
to accept complaints, investigate whether there has been a violation of civil rights
laws, and either seek voluntary compliance or authorize lawsuits for enforcement.227
Whether they “enforce” an anti-preference law may depend on a number of factors
that can only be answered by a review of state law.  Can they initiate their own inves-
tigations, or must they receive complaints before commencing an investigation?  Do
they hold hearings in which each side is given an opportunity to present evidence?
Can they go into court to enforce orders?  In short, are they more like a prosecutor
or more like a judge?
In answering that last question, one might take a step back and ask exactly what
the differences are between judges and prosecutors in assessing the validity of the
laws they enforce.  A prosecutor, after all, is an attorney with special duties.  “The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty
is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”228  Yet, this duty to seek justice, and the pre-
sumption that prosecutors are sworn to uphold the United States Constitution,229 is
insufficient to treat them like judges for purposes of their willingness to enforce a
state criminal law that might violate the United States Constitution.  That is, their
membership in the executive branch, and their general task to enforce a set of state
laws, apparently renders them appropriate defendants in a suit challenging a state
criminal law.  One normally does not think of a prosecutor’s duty to do justice as the
equivalent of an obligation to resolve all factual and legal disputes in an even-handed
way.230  Whether a member of a civil rights department or commission is an appropriate
defendant in a claim challenging an anti-preference law may depend upon whether
they are deemed to have such an obligation.
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231 See supra Part II.A (describing the enforcement scheme established in Michigan).
232 See MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, RESOLUTION ON THE MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
(2004), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/aarelease3_86196_7.pdf (announcing
the Commission’s opposition to the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative and characterizing it as “an
attempt to mislead Michigan voters regarding the issue of discrimination by state entities”).
The press release accompanying the resolution contained a quote from Commissioner Mark
Bernstein to the effect that the initiative “is a shameful attempt to confuse and manipulate
unsuspecting Michigan voters. Ward Connelly’s initiative is to civil rights what an ax is to a
tree. Don’t let these extremists tear down our state’s great tradition of enabling and protecting
diversity.” Press Release, Mich. Dep’t of Civil Rights, Mich. Civil Rights Comm’n Adopts
Resolution Opposing Mich. Civil Rights Initiative (Mar. 11, 2004), available at http://www
.michigan.gov/documents/aarelease3_86196_7.pdf.
233 Mich. Civil Rights Commission Releases Report on MCRI Signature Gathering Deception,
MEDIAMOUSE, June 13, 2006, http://www.mediamouse.org/news/2006/06/michigan-civil-1.php.
234 See Mich. Exec. Directive No. 2006-7 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://www.michigan
.gov/gov/0,1607,7-168-36898_40426-155895--,00.html.
235 MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, “ONE MICHIGAN” AT THE CROSSROADS: AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE IMPACT OF PROPOSAL 06-02, at 16 (2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/mdcr/FinalCommissionReport3-07_1_189266_7.pdf. The Commission also con-
cluded that a government-run program for after-school tutoring only for girls did not violate
Proposal 2 because it was not “public education.” Id. at 45.
One other consideration merits attention.  A department or commission may
have been initially created to enforce other civil rights laws; the enforcement of an
anti-preference law may have been foisted upon them by the “remedies” provision
in such law.231  The department officials or commissioners may be very reluctant to
enforce that law in its intended form.  Michigan again provides an interesting example.
The Michigan Civil Rights Commission was a vigorous opponent of Proposal 2 from
the outset.232  It subsequently conducted extensive hearings into the manner in which
signatures were collected to place the initiative on the ballot and concluded that massive
fraud had been used to collect those signatures.233  When these efforts proved inade-
quate to have the initiative removed from the ballot, or to defeat it, the Commission
was tasked by Michigan Governor Granholm to report on its effects.234  This report,
citing Hunter and Seattle School Dist. No. 1, concluded that the amendment was “in
direct conflict with existing federal law.”235  All of this might be relevant to whether
individual commissioners in Michigan presented a “credible threat” of enforcing the
Michigan anti-preference law against anyone.  At the very least, it would be ironic if
the commissioners were the only state actors capable of being sued in a challenge to
the law.
e. State Legislators
Professor Manian suggests that the problem of standing in the abortion tort cases
could be resolved by permitting suits for declaratory judgments against the state leg-
754 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:709
236 Manian, supra note 97, at 165–70. Manian also suggests that governors might be sued
for signing such bills into law. Id. at 197–98. She believes the same rationales that should
overcome justiciability and immunity problems for legislators would work for overcoming
the same problems for governors.
237 Id. at 168 (“[T]he mere enactment of such [self-enforcing tort law] is an enforcement
action, so to speak.”). Professor Manian defines a “self-enforcing tort law” as one that
“impose[s] such a high risk of a draconian penalty on [certain] conduct that it essentially
bans that conduct.” Id. at 158.
238 It is equally unclear whom one should sue if one wished to challenge an older “self-
enforcing tort law,” where the legislators who passed it might be retired or dead. Or what
would happen if the initial defendants retired during the lawsuit.
239 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
240 Id. at 190–96 (describing a “dual function” approach to legislative immunity).
241 Id. at 178–79.
242 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
islators that passed the laws.236  Her basic rationale is that the abortion tort cases
involve “self-enforcing tort laws,” and therefore, that the legislators who pass them
are acting in both a legislative and executive capacity.237
One obvious problem with this solution is that it very well may be ineffective
for laws passed through other means, like ballot initiatives or through development
of the common law.238  (Anti-preference laws have been, to date, enacted by ballot
initiatives.)239  Nonetheless, it is certainly possible for a legislature to enact an anti-
preference law, so some attention should be paid to Manian’s proposal.
The first problem, of course, is legislative immunity.  Professor Manian is correct
in noting that courts have examined the dual or multiple roles that legislators can have
in taking various actions, and have provided legislative immunity only for those acts
that are truly legislative in nature.240  But she cites no case (and I am unaware of any)
in which the same act is deemed to be both legislative and executive in nature (and
that same act is voting for a law).  At the very least, Professor Manian’s suggestion
would require a significant step (and limitation) in the law of legislative immunity.
Second, Professor Manian argues only for a declaratory judgment action against
state legislators, recognizing that an injunction requiring a vote to repeal a law might
be an ineffective and/or improperly intrusive solution.241  But then the only relief re-
maining is unlikely to be anything more than an advisory opinion.  State legislators
are not going to sue the federal plaintiffs (be they local municipalities or others) in
state court if the federal plaintiffs violate the state law, and, as noted earlier, without
any res judicata value, or some possibility of changing defendants’ behavior, such
that defendants will have a coercive or determinative effect on the ultimate decision-
maker (viz., state judges), a declaratory judgment does not provide any remedy to the
plaintiff.242  Not only are the state legislators unlikely to sue a federal plaintiff in the
future; they are unlikely to do anything in the future that will harm the federal plaintiff’s
rights.  What they have done to the federal plaintiff they did by passing the law, and
that, under this scenario, already has taken place.  A declaratory judgment is a pro-
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243 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 97, at § 2751 (declaratory judgment
“permits actual controversies to be settled before they ripen into violations of law ”(emphasis
added)).
244 See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 468
n.5 (1984) (“[I]t seems questionable whether a complaint that sought only a declaration that
past conduct was unlawful would present to the District Court a case or controversy over
which it could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
245  Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2005) (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting) (opining that in a challenge to a statute that imposed liability on anyone who per-
formed an abortion on a minor without parental consent or knowledge, state officials who
operated medical institutions were proper defendants because they might, in the future, sue on
behalf of their institutions to recover under the statute); Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146, 147–49
(9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a state judge was not a proper defendant in a case challenging
a state law for the appointment of a temporary guardian and stating that plaintiff could have
sued her ex-husband, who had previously sought a receiver for her, or her mother, who had
previously been appointed a receiver).
246 Cf. Borgmann, supra note 98, at 779 (“Because the ability to sue for damages under
the statute [in Nova Health Systems] depends upon unpredictable events, abortion providers
cannot know in advance who will sue them.”); Manian, supra note 97, at 141 (“The plaintiff
doctors [in Okpalobi] had no way of knowing which, if any, of their patients would eventually
enforce Act 825.”).
247 Public Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952). The well-
pleaded complaint rule is the Court’s interpretation of federal “arising under” jurisdiction
spective remedy.243  Accordingly, courts have expressed grave doubts about the
propriety of actions seeking a declaratory judgment concerning past actions.244  Suing
legislators does not appear like a successful litigation strategy.
f. State Court Plaintiffs
At least one court and one judge have suggested that the problem of finding an
appropriate federal court defendant can be fixed by finding a person or entity who is
likely to sue in state court under the statute being challenged.245
Two problems suggest themselves.  First, it may not be so easy to predict (much
less prove) who is going to sue in state court.  Unless the federal court plaintiff can find
a person likely to sue in state court, the case will lack the “credible threat” needed for
federal jurisdiction.246
Second, even if such a person can be found, the modern understanding of the
well-pleaded complaint rule has the following corollary:
Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks
in essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened state
court action, it is the character of the threatened action, and not
of the defense, which will determine whether there is federal-
question jurisdiction in the District Court.247
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
248 Monks v. Hetherington, 573 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1978) (dismissing challenge
by TV broadcaster to Oklahoma statute, requiring retraction and acknowledgment of falsity
of certain statements, as violative of broadcaster’s First Amendment rights. Federal action
was brought against state court defamation plaintiff and federal courts lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because “[t]he underlying controversy [t]here [was] the defamation action.”).
249 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
250 Id. at 487 n.31.
251 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Curiously, though, prior to granting the motion
for class certification, the court granted a temporary restraining order against the Governor
and Attorney General of the state in part because of those officials’ “refusal . . . to agree to a
moratorium on enforcement actions against municipalities, agencies, and other state entities.”
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96 4024, 1996 WL 691962, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27,
1996).
252 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, No. 06-15024, 2006 WL 3953321, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2006), stay pending appeal granted, 473 F.3d 237, 253 (6th Cir. 2006).
That is, an assertion by a declaratory judgment plaintiff that he is about to be sued
under a state law that itself violates federal law is not a basis for federal jurisdiction.
A person about to be sued in state court for defamation cannot file a declaratory judg-
ment action in federal court seeking a judgment that the alleged defamatory statements
were protected by the First Amendment.248
So for both practical and legal reasons, federal declaratory judgment suits against
potential state court plaintiffs remain problematic.
g. Universities/Municipalities
One last possibility we must consider is whether those who have to comply with
an anti-preference law might be possible defendants.  I will use universities and
municipalities as examples of these government compliers, but the discussion should
be applicable to others as well.
At first glance, the notion that a municipality could be a defendant in a lawsuit
based upon Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1249 seems counterintuitive.  After
all, a municipality-like entity (a school district) was the plaintiff in that case, and,
indeed, won attorneys’ fees against the state.250  The lesson, one would think, is that
lower-level state entities have the right to be free from improper state regulation and
can sue for that kind of relief.
But things have not been that simple.  As noted earlier, in the challenge to
California’s anti-preference law, the court certified a defendant class that included all
local government entities or other governmental instrumentalities bound by the law.251
In the challenge to Michigan’s anti-preference law, the members of the governing
boards of three universities were sued.252  They filed cross-claims themselves against
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253 Id.
254 See The University Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, Coal. to Defend Affirmative
Action, 2006 WL 3953321 (No. 06-15024) (arguing that they were unnecessary parties, and
should be dropped pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21); see also id. (“The
University Defendants did not write Proposal 2; they did not pass Proposal 2; they cannot
change Proposal 2; they are not executive branch entities charged with the responsibility of
enforcing Proposal 2. The only role of the Universities is that they—like every other public
body affected by this constitutional amendment—must follow Proposal 2.”); id. (“[Plaintiff]
seeks a declaration that Proposal 2 is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforce-
ment. . . . If this claim . . . has merit, then [plaintiff] can obtain all the relief it seeks from the
Defendant Attorney General. The University Defendants, however, are powerless to afford
[plaintiff] the relief they demand.”).
On appeal, the Universities continued with their theme, arguing that “a party who has
no connection with a law beyond the obligation to follow it is [not] a proper defendant in a
lawsuit challenging that law.” Defendants/Cross-Appellants’ Second Cross-Appeal Brief at
7, Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., No. 08-1534 (6th Cir.
filed June 12, 2009).
255 See Plaintiff Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action et al.’s (BAMN’s) Brief in
Opposition to the University Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, Coal. to Defend Affirmative
Action, 2006 WL 3953321 (No. 06-15024).
256 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
924, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2008). The court’s discussion is a bit confusing, but it seems to have
essentially relied on the traditional equal protection claims brought by the plaintiff—i.e., that
the elimination of any race-conscious decision-making itself violated the Equal Protection
Clause regardless of the ultimate source of that decision to eliminate—and concluded that
those claims were sufficiently related to the “political burden” claims that it was appropriate
to keep the universities as defendants.
The court’s discussion is confusing because it also agreed with the University defendants
that a finding of unconstitutionality would not automatically restore race-conscious admissions
decisions at the universities; “[r]ather, the universities would have to choose to do so on their
own.” Id. It then concluded by asserting that the universities’ “undeniable stake . . . in all these
issues” made it “inappropriate to cast them aside.” Id. One might think that the court’s inability
to force the universities to do what plaintiff wanted—that the universities retained an inde-
pendent capacity to refuse to do it—would cut against plaintiffs’ standing (and, specifically,
their attempt to show redressability) to sue the universities.
257 Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96 4024, 1996 WL 691962, at *3 n.7 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 27, 1996). Judge Henderson’s one-sentence rejoinder was that “[t]he Court cannot accept
the Governor seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.253  But after those cross-claims
were dismissed, they sought to be dismissed from the case themselves, arguing that
they did not “enforce” the Michigan anti-preference law, but only complied with it.254
Plaintiff in that case, in turn, argued that “[t]he defendant Universities may not have
written, supported or passed Proposal 2.  But they have implemented it.”255  The
court’s resolution of these competing claims side-stepped the issue.256  So, too, the
court in the challenge to California’s anti-preference law gave little analysis in reject-
ing the claim of the defendants that they were “bystanders” to “any political process
burden imposed on plaintiffs.”257
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defendants’ contention that victims of this sort of political process harm are necessarily pre-
cluded from preliminary relief simply because the enactment in question is denominated as
‘self-executing.’” Id.
258 See supra notes 119–31 and accompanying text.
259 Thus, although the Duke Power Company was obviously a party to the case that bears
its name, the Court specifically declined to address whether it was a proper party. Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 n.16 (1978). So, too, in Ex parte
Young; the railroads subject to the Minnesota statute were sued by their shareholders, but the
propriety of their joinder was never really discussed. 209 U.S. 123, 129 (1908). Arguably,
under the Court’s later decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., the railroads (unlike Duke
Power) may have been acting under color of state authority. 398 U.S. 144, 170–71 (1970).
260 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
261 See supra Part IV.A.
Can those who implement a law, or comply with it, be considered “enforcers” of
the statute?  Under some circumstances, one would think that they can.  If the under-
lying conduct is itself unconstitutional, one would think that those carrying out the
law’s requirements can be enjoined.  But the arguments set forth in Part I of this
Article assume that the problem is not the underlying conduct of eschewing all race-
conscious decision-making, but the process by which the decision to engage in that
underlying conduct was made.
Two possibilities need consideration.  First, as noted above, courts have permitted
suit where the relief the court could provide would have a coercive influence on the
chances that the ultimate decision-maker would issue a favorable decision.258  That
may be the case with anti-preference laws.  In many instances, universities and
municipalities engaged in race-conscious decision-making prior to the enactment
of anti-preference laws.  It is easy to conclude that a judgment precluding someone
else from enforcing it against those entities would likely change their decision.  But
the problem with using the “coercive influence” cases is that those cases only ex-
plain why it is acceptable to sue the “influencing” party.  They do not explain why it
is acceptable to sue the ultimate decision-maker if one does not have a legal right to
any particular decision.259
The second possibility is that plaintiffs have suffered an injury to their “procedural
rights,” and the universities and municipalities are causing that injury by considering
a state anti-preference law to be dispositive.260  Thus, just like an administrative
agency that has failed to properly consider a required factor in making a decision,
the “compliers” like universities and municipalities can be told (by a court) that they
must reconsider their decision to be race neutral in the absence of any influence by the
anti-preference law.
Of course, this possibility is subject to all the concerns that were discussed when
the possibility of an analogue to an injury to “procedural rights” was first broached
in this Article.261  Second, the difficulties of enforcement are much greater than in the
typical “procedural rights” case.  Whether a specific federal agency issued an environ-
mental impact statement is fairly straightforward.  Most administrative agencies have
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262 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998) (discussing the general
ability of those adversely affected to challenge legal bases of administrative agency deci-
sions); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Valpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
263 See supra Part II.B.
264 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
265 For this reason, Professor Borgmann agrees that the Fifth Circuit correctly dismissed
claims for injunctive relief against the Governor and Attorney General in Okpalobi. Borgmann,
supra note 98, at 772–73.
I think that a different situation is presented by laws that have both criminal and privately-
enforceable civil provisions. The kinds of liability involved with criminal law—jail terms,
specifically—deter on a different order of magnitude than damages, no matter how large. Thus,
an injunction against a prosecutor precluding enforcement of the law’s criminal provision
would be of substantial benefit to a litigant even if, as in several of the abortion tort cases, a
court were powerless to protect the plaintiff from civil lawsuits under the same provision.
to give reasons for their decisions, and the factors that influenced them; a failure to
consider a factor required by law is relatively easy to determine.262  But universities,
municipalities, and other state agencies need not give any reasons at all for their deci-
sions.  An order requiring them not to consider a particular factor (an anti-preference
law) might prove very difficult to police.
3. Redressability
The problem with redressability in a challenge to an anti-preference law is the
one hinted at in our review of the two injunctions issued by federal courts against
anti-preference laws263 and the same one that the Tenth Circuit noted in Nova Health
Systems.264  Even if one enjoins the Governor, the Attorney General, or a civil rights
commission from enforcing the civil provisions of an anti-preference law, that injunc-
tion would have no effect when a private plaintiff sues a state agency in state court for
violating it.265  So, too, a declaratory judgment against any of those possible “enforcers”
would not bind anyone else.  A state agency relying solely on the judgment of a lower
federal court, in a case in which it was not a party, would be taking a substantial risk
in taking race-conscious measures in violation of an anti-preference law.  Accord-
ingly, it is less than clear that an injunction or declaratory judgment against a few state
“enforcement” officials would really change the behavior of most state agencies.
Those with good legal advice likely would still continue to comply with the law until
a dispositive opinion of the state supreme court or the United States Supreme Court
suggested otherwise.
The only alternative would be to sue the state agencies that are complying with
the anti-preference law.  The problems here are equally troubling.  First, as already
discussed, it is not clear that a state agency simply complying with an anti-preference
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266 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908).
267 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (holding that nonparties to  litigation
cannot be bound by any judgment in it).
268 Ann Althouse, Why Talking about “States’ Rights” Cannot Avoid the Need for
Normative Federalism Analysis: A Response to Professors Baker and Young, 51 DUKE L.J.
363, 374 n.41 (2000). But see John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1008–10
(2008) (arguing that Ex parte Young, properly understood, permitted a lawsuit in only a limited
number of cases where asserting a federal constitutional defense in an enforcement action in
state court was an inadequate remedy).
law is really enforcing it or has “some connection” with its enforcement (as required
by Ex parte Young).266
In addition, even if a court could gain jurisdiction over all state agencies, it is not
as clear that an injunction could necessarily be issued against them.  Again, the degree
of threat and harm necessary to obtain injunctive relief is often deemed higher than
that simply needed to establish a case or controversy with a particular defendant.
Yet without the possibility of injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment against any
state agency may have very little effect.  It is only binding in a subsequent litigation
against the same plaintiff, and, more specifically, would not be binding in any state
court litigation where someone else seeks to enforce the anti-preference law against
a state agency.267
Moreover, as we saw back in Part II.B, the possibility of an injunction may not
suffice for redressability.  All of this suggests that, even if causation can properly be
found between one of the defendants and the injury that the plaintiffs challenging an
anti-preference law claim to be suffering, substantial questions of redressability would
remain.  And aside and apart from Article III considerations, there is simply great doubt
about the effectiveness of any lower federal court judgment about the constitutionality
of an anti-preference law.
V.
In this section, I examine whether one obvious solution to the justiciability prob-
lems would actually fix the “problem.”  I then discuss whether, in fact, it is a problem.
A. A Congressional Fix?
Congress might try to fix the problems associated with privately-enforced tort
laws that create constitutional problems by eliminating a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity for any violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.  To keep things simple,
we can assume that Congress will only eliminate Eleventh Amendment immunity for
forward-looking relief.  (This is obviously a solution for which there has been little
need in the past since the Ex parte Young doctrine has been deemed to have “fixed”
the problem for most claims of forward-looking relief.)268
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269 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006)
(“[N]o one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the
Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those
provisions.” (second alteration in original)).
270 See supra notes 207–23 and accompanying text.
271 The “state of affairs” to which I refer is the inability to seek a ruling regarding the
constitutionality of a statute prior to violating its provisions. The critics occasionally refer
to the problem as one of unreviewability in federal court. See, e.g., Manian, supra note 97,
at 153 (describing tort statutes as “categorically unreviewable in federal court”). This is either
an overstatement or an understatement of the problem. If the problem is that no one will ever
Congress surely has this authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.269
Just as certainly, this will eliminate any Eleventh Amendment problem under Ex parte
Young.
The harder question is whether the “causation” and “redressability” problem can
be fixed in this fashion.  Again, there does not seem to be any substantial case law on
this question, but I tend to think that the answer is at least unclear, and may be “no.”
The enforcers of the state law still will be state judges, and the problems of justi-
ciability in suing state judges discussed previously would be just as relevant to any
standing analysis.270  Calling the defendant “State” instead of “State Judge Smith”
does not really change the underlying reality.  Moreover, a declaration against the
State, for example, is usually addressed to the executive branch of the state and would
not appear to be binding on state judges, if for no other reason than it would undermine
the equality of lower federal court and state judges in the interpretation of federal law.
B. How Big a Problem?
What, then, if a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to a particular privately-
enforced state law could not be heard in federal court for the reasons I have outlined?
That is, a challenge to such a law could only be asserted by a defendant accused in
court of having violated it.  Or, if it could be heard in a pre-enforcement challenge, the
judgment would have very little effect in actually settling the issue of constitutionality.
Private lawsuits are intended to, and can, deter the kind of conduct that is their
subject.  If there is a substantial amount of liability involved, they can deter that con-
duct even if it is, at least arguably, constitutionally protected.  Pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to privately enforceable laws—challenges by those who want to engage in the
arguably protected activity, but do not want to risk being sued and finding that the
conduct is not constitutionally protected—are, as we have seen, difficult.
All of this is true, and it might indeed deter some constitutionally protected
conduct.  My only point in this section is a modest one: this is hardly a new state of
affairs brought about by legislatures hostile to abortion rights or free speech rights,
or by state populations opposed to race-conscious decision-making.  We have had
to live with this state of affairs (and situations even more problematic) for quite a
while now, and the republic has survived.271
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risk violating the laws, then they are unreviewable in federal, state, and any other court. If
people are willing to violate the law in order to test its validity, but cannot maintain a pre-
enforcement challenge that the law violates some federal right, then the state law can be chal-
lenged in federal court if federal courts have jurisdiction (for example, by reason of diversity
or supplemental jurisdiction) over a damages lawsuit brought by a plaintiff, and thus would
not be “categorically unreviewable” in federal court. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.,
561 F.3d 233, 237, 253 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
preempted certain of plaintiffs’ tort claims after defendant-vaccine manufacturer removed the
tort damages claims to federal court), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Aug. 4,
2009) (No. 09-152).
272 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (providing federal courts with jurisdiction
for claims “arising under” federal law).
273 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967) (“During most of the Nation’s first century,
Congress relied on the state courts to vindicate essential rights arising under the Constitution
and federal laws. The only exception was [a statute] providing for review in this Court when
a claim of federal right was denied by a state court.”).
274 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–59, 565–66 (1977).
275 Id. at §§ 46–48.
276 Id. at § 652A.
277 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1988) (reversing
monetary awards in tort action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress); N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (reversing money judgment awarded to public
official in a state court libel action against his critics).
278 The passage of these state statutes is often attributed to a 1989 episode of the television
show “60 Minutes,” which reported on the use of a chemical (commonly known as Alar)
on apples in Washington state. David J. Bederman et al., Of Banana Bills and Veggie Hate
Crimes: The Constitutionality of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
135, 135 (1997); see also Eileen Gay Jones, Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and
Food Safety in the Era of Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
823, 827–33 (2001). There appears to be twelve states with such laws. Id. at 833.
Federal courts did not have general “arising under” jurisdiction until 1875.272
Prior to that time, rights under the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, had to
be enforced in state courts, subject only to the Supreme Court’s appellate review.273
The notion of pre-enforcement review may not have been invented by Ex parte Young,
but it was certainly novel.
Tort law frequently has implications for constitutional rights.  Most prominently,
defamation,274 intentional infliction of emotional distress,275 and invasion of privacy276
torts frequently implicate rights under the First Amendment.  Most of the limitations
that the Court has identified in these areas have come through review of money judg-
ments in tort cases.277
Similarly, in the 1990s, a number of states passed so-called “agricultural disparage-
ment” laws.278  Designed to protect the agricultural sector of these states’ economies,
these laws give the producers of agricultural products (and sometimes others, like
shippers and sellers) a right to sue for damages against those who promulgate dis-
paraging statements or false information about the safety of the consumption of food
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279 Bederman et al., supra note 278, at 145–46.
280 See, e.g., id. at 149–56; Jones, supra note 278, at 833–42.
281 Action for a Clean Env. v. State, 457 S.E.2d 273, 273–74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
282 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977). Precisely what statements may be
re-published pursuant to this privilege is subject to debate. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
for example, distinguishes between the “fair report privilege,” permitting re-publication of
government proceedings, and the “neutral reportage privilege,” covering statements made
outside those proceedings. Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48, 52–53 n.6 (Pa. 2004), cert. denied
sub nom Troy Pub. Co. v. Norton, 544 U.S. 956 (2005).
283 See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Edwards v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Trainor v. Standard
Times, 924 A.2d 766, 770 n.4 (R.I. 2007).
284 Norton, 860 A.2d at 57.
285 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 20 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002), rev’d, 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004); James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 33–34
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d
1136, 1140 (Ohio 2002).
286 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
products.279  For a variety of reasons, academic writers have contended that these laws
are unconstitutional as violations of the First Amendment.280  But no court has so held,
and the one effort at a pre-enforcement challenge (in state court) failed due to the lack
of a justiciable controversy.281  Those who wish to comment about the safety of food
products in those states are taking their chances that they could be sued in state court,
and only then can they assert their constitutional challenges to the law.
Other constitutionally debatable components of state tort law are created by the
state judiciaries themselves as part of their role in developing the common law.  Take
the so-called “fair reporting” or “neutral reportage” privilege in defamation cases,
where re-publication of libelous statements of public importance is deemed privileged
regardless of whether the re-publication was made with “actual malice” or any other
relevant scienter standard.282  Some courts have held and/or suggested that this privilege
is mandated by the First Amendment.283  Other courts have rejected the privilege and,
obviously, any suggestion that it is mandated by the United States Constitution.284
As far as I can tell, no cases have permitted potential speakers or writers to test the
absence of a “fair report privilege” in any state in some pre-enforcement proceeding
challenging that absence as a violation of the First Amendment.  Those who publish—
bloggers and newspapers alike—have to take their chances that they might be sued for
reporting on defamatory statements made by others.
Moving from the First Amendment to the Second, this last decade has seen increas-
ingly aggressive use of tort law against gun manufacturers.  Specifically, a concerted
effort by mayors of major cities has led to tort law suits being lodged against major
gun manufacturers, alleging that their system of distributing and marketing guns
constitutes a nuisance.285  Some, including one of the lawyers for the landmark case
District of Columbia v. Heller,286 have argued that such lawsuits infringe upon Second
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287 See generally ROBERT A. LEVY, SHAKEDOWN: HOW CORPORATIONS, GOVERNMENT, AND
TRIAL LAWYERS ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 55–87 (2004) (describing the recent flood
of litigation against gun manufacturers and the reasons why such lawsuits are illegitimate).
288 Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 522 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (affirming dismissal on grounds that court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant
mayors).
289 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). This provision states that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another,” and that no cause of action may be brought under any state or local
law inconsistent with that standard. Id.
290 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1010–11 (2008).
291 Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
292 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 454 U.S. 1022, 1023 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(“This Court—and all federal courts—have enough to do without ‘pre-empting’ state courts on
matters initially of state concern. . . . The policies of federalism and comity militate in favor of
affording state judges—who are as capable as are federal judges of enforcing the Constitution
of the United States, and have taken the same oath to do so—the initial opportunity to consider
the scope and validity of state statutes.”). Chief Justice Burger’s dissent was joined by then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 1022.
Amendment rights.287  But the gun manufacturers will have to present those arguments
in the tort cases that have been filed against them.  Gun owners’ efforts to preempt
the lawsuits and obtain a declaratory judgment that such suits would violate their
constitutional rights failed on jurisdictional (albeit, not justiciability) grounds.288
One could provide other examples as well, especially if we recognize that fed-
eral statutes can also extend protection to conduct arguably subject to state tort law.
The “Good Samaritan” provision of the Communications Decency Act289 and, more
generally, any federal law which preempts state tort law will have this effect.290  The
important fact is that the challenges to state tort law generally take place in the tort
cases themselves, not in any declaratory judgment action against the state tort law.
Is this state of affairs a bad thing?  Some privately enforceable rules will deter
people from engaging in conduct that is arguably protected by the Constitution or
other law.  (That certainly seems to be the objective of the gun nuisance suits.)  To
the extent that Ex parte Young expressed the view that no one should be forced into
choosing between the abandonment of constitutional rights or risking the imposition
of substantial liability, these laws certainly are inconsistent with that sentiment.  But,
the Court has not always adhered to that sentiment.  Fitts291 has never been overruled.
Several Justices have even expressed the view (clearly, a minority view) that federal
courts should never opine on the constitutionality of a state law prior to the state courts
having interpreted that provision.292
Perhaps they had a point.  There are some advantages in allowing the court before
which an actual lawsuit for violation of a state law is pending to have the first crack
at interpreting that law and determining its constitutionality.  State courts are the
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293 Id. at 1024 (“Even a cursory examination of the lengthy statute . . . discloses that
the state courts might well have construed the law so as to avoid each of the[ ] perceived
deficiencies [identified by the lower courts].”); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99–101 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (castigating majority for
misinterpreting state law).
294 Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 356–57 (5th Cir. 1999), rehearing en banc granted,
201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000), rev’d on rehearing en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
295 For example, Professor Borgmann posits a hypothetical under which a former abortion
patient sues under Act 825, claiming damages based upon the fact that she did not know that
abortion constituted “killing a child.” Borgmann, supra note 98, at 764; see also Achilles,
supra note 115, at 859 (“[T]he statute permits a woman to recover for the wrongful death of
her fetus simply by proving that her fetus was aborted.”). One could just as easily imagine
a state court rejecting such a lawsuit on the ground that disclosure to plaintiff that she was
undergoing an abortion was sufficient to put her on notice that the procedure would result
in “killing a child,” and that plaintiff’s damages for that harm are thus reduced to zero under
the statute’s “damages are reduced for disclosed harms” provision. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.12(C)(1) (2009). (Indeed, federal constitutional considerations might militate in favor
of such an interpretation.) The point is not that Professor Borgmann’s interpretation of Act 825
is incorrect, or that mine is correct; rather, it is that neither of us can provide authoritative
interpretations of Act 825—and neither can federal courts. See Buck & Rienzi, supra note
71, at 423–24 (noting the “ambitious exercise of judicial interpretation” by Missouri courts
in interpreting Missouri partial-birth abortion law).
ultimate arbiters of state law, and they may interpret the state statutes so as to avoid
any constitutional problems.293
In one of the recent appellate court cases, for example, the defendants had argued
that the Louisiana statute providing for damages against certain abortion providers,
Act 825, was just designed to enhance Louisiana’s “informed consent” statutes related
to abortion.294  The initial panel decision rejected that interpretation, but ultimately, the
question of what obligations Act 825 imposed would be a matter of state law.  While
it is certainly possible to envision interpretations of Act 825 that would be inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on abortion, one can also imagine a
very narrow interpretation of the statute that might perhaps save it, or at least certain
applications of it.295
Of course, this advantage is of no use if a case raising the question is never filed.
I tend to think that tort law, though, is generally less deterring than criminal law.  A
damage award is particularly less important than imprisonment for the very rich, the
very poor, and (assuming an important constitutional right may be at stake) the ideo-
logically committed.  At the very least, before abandoning the traditional method of
assessing the constitutionality of privately enforceable laws, we might try to determine
whether substantial amounts (and not just “any”) valuable, arguably protected, con-
duct is being deterred, be it abortions in Louisiana, discussions of food safety in South
Dakota, or race-conscious decision-making in public education in California.  If it
is, then perhaps some adjustment in our traditional methods of adjudication might
be appropriate.
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296 Even if federal jurisdiction might otherwise exist (because of diversity or supplemental
jurisdiction) in a tort suit brought against a state agency for violation of an anti-preference
law, the Eleventh Amendment would present a barrier to bringing a claim under state law in
federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984).
CONCLUSION
Unlike many other laws and rules that affect constitutional rights, anti-preference
laws to date have been the direct product of state-wide elections.  Like some other laws
and rules, they are laws whose enforcement against violators are provided primarily
by courts, with only modest (or, depending on the state, no) assistance or involve-
ment from the executive branch of state government.  In the case of anti-preference
laws, because federal jurisdiction over a lawsuit seeking damages for violation of the
law may be difficult to obtain, such enforcement is most likely going to be provided
by state courts.296
This creates a problem for any pre-enforcement challenge brought in federal court.
As we have seen, depending upon state law, the existence of federal jurisdiction might
very well be able to be challenged.  Just as importantly, even where jurisdiction exists,
a lower federal court likely will be impotent to substantially change the overall incen-
tives for compliance with the law.  They cannot, at least pursuant to the arguments that
have been examined in this Article, require state agencies to make race-conscious
decisions.  And, if they cannot do that, there is probably little help that a lower fed-
eral court can provide to a state agency subject to an anti-preference law.  A state
agency that is told by a lower federal court judge (or judges) that it can ignore an anti-
preference law would follow that advice at its peril.
Thus, the best bet for a state agency who wishes to launch an effective challenge
to an anti-preference law will be to wait to be sued in state court, and then to assert the
challenge as a federal defense.  Of course, state agencies may not want to intention-
ally violate the law in order to test its constitutionality, and the course of action for
those individuals or groups who claim that the anti-preference laws impose a political
burden on them is less clear.  A mere declaration by a lower court in federal court
that the law is unconstitutional may have little value—it is unclear whether they are
entitled to an injunction against a state agency—and they are certainly only entitled
to an injunction against those they have sued.  Unlike state agencies, they cannot
themselves violate the law and cannot thus set up a test case in state court through
their own actions.  Their best bet may be to file a declaratory judgment action against
someone with actual enforcement powers, hope for a win in a federal circuit court,
and—unlike most court of appeals winners—join the law’s defenders in asking the
Supreme Court to take the case.  Only the agreement of the Supreme Court on the
law’s unconstitutionality can really provide them with the relief that they actually
need—a federal court judgment that state courts will be bound to accept.
